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ACCOUNT ME IN: AGENCIES IN QUEST OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss* 
INTRODUCTION 
Not long after taking office, Lisa Jackson, appointed by 
President Obama as Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) revamped the evaluation procedure for the EPA’s 
Integrated Risk Information System (“IRIS”) database.1 The 
database was an initiative undertaken by the EPA to improve the 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law. I would like to 
thank Oded Na’aman for his very useful suggestions; Heather Field for sharing 
her immense expertise about the IRS; also, Marsha Cohen for her aid in 
conducting the research and Ashutosh Bhagwat, Marsha Cohen, David 
Coolidge, Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Elizabeth Magill, Jerry Mashaw, Anne 
Joseph O’Connell, Reuel Schiller, and Glen Staszewski for their helpful 
comments and suggestions on previous drafts. I am very grateful to Peter Barton 
Hutt, Richard Merrill, Deborah Wolf, and other interviewees to whom I 
promised confidentiality (and therefore cannot name them) for generously 
sharing their stories and their valuable time with me. Finally, I wish to thank 
Fatemeh Shahangian for her excellent research assistance. All errors are, of 
course, my own. 
1 The EPA’s website explains that:  
The Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) is a human health 
assessment program that evaluates quantitative and qualitative risk 
information on effects that may result from exposure to environmental 
contaminants. IRIS was initially developed for EPA staff in response to 
a growing demand for consistent information on substances for use in 
risk assessments, decision-making, and regulatory activities. The 
information in IRIS is intended for those without extensive training in 
toxicology, but with some knowledge of health sciences.  
Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). 
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scientific accuracy and the quality of information available on risks 
associated with certain chemicals; it is used, for example, when the 
EPA determines whether to establish air and water quality 
standards regulating certain chemicals.2 IRIS assessments are 
neither rules nor adjudications; rather, they are background 
materials later used in making rules. Therefore, they are invisible 
to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).3 The procedures 
surrounding the IRIS database—as with everything related to the 
project—were designed by the EPA and are not mandated by law.4 
In spite of this potential freedom to choose any or no 
accountability mechanisms, the procedure the EPA adopted for 
IRIS—from the start of the system—included extensive steps of 
review, and numerous opportunities for input and checks by 
external actors.5 The additional procedures put in place by 
Administrator Jackson aimed at achieving a process that is “more 
transparent and timely, and . . . will ensure the highest level of 
scientific integrity.”6  
The adopted process exposed the EPA’s suggestions to external 
peer review, in addition to notice and comment, by using the same 
process required for informal rulemaking under the APA;7 it also 
subjected these suggestions to review by the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) in the White House’s Office of 
Management and Budget (“OMB”), which is required for 
significant rules.8 Most of these elements were part of the IRIS 
                                                          
2 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-440, CHEMICAL 
ASSESSMENTS: LOW PRODUCTIVITY AND NEW INTERAGENCY REVIEW PROCESS 
LIMIT THE USEFULNESS AND CREDIBILITY OF EPA’S INTEGRATED RISK 
INFORMATION SYSTEM, 6–8 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d08440.pdf. 
3 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551–559 (West 2010). 
4 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 10. 
5 See infra Part III.B (describing these procedures in detail). 
6 Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
New Process for Development of Integrated Risk Information System Health 
Assessments, 1–2 (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/iris/pdfs/ 
IRIS_PROCESS_MEMO.5.21.09.PDF. 
7 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 2010). 
8 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557–61 (1994). For a discussion of the regulatory review of 
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system from the start; in one form or another, the agency 
voluntarily chose to expose its decisions to extensive scrutiny from 
various outside parties. 
Similarly, as part of the reform of the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) after 1998, Commissioner Rossotti and the IRS staff 
worked hard to increase the agency’s responsiveness and 
transparency. The agency put substantial efforts into making the 
Internal Revenue Manual more accessible, as discussed more 
extensively in Part III.C. It invested in improving customer service 
and, consequently, the number of calls answered rose dramatically, 
and the quality of the IRS’ response received very positive 
reviews.9 Improvement in service was required under the 1998 
legislation reforming the IRS.10 However, Congress had previously 
passed other reforms requiring improvements in customer 
service—for example taxpayer rights provisions in the 1980s—but 
without sincere agency commitment and agency initiated efforts, 
those had limited effect.11 This time, the agency was committed to 
improving customer service and put in place changes increasing 
transparency and responsiveness.  
Finally, before the courts started requiring that agencies answer 
each comment submitted to them, and before agencies took the 
spirit of the Freedom of Information Act seriously, the FDA, under 
the direction of its Chief Counsel, Peter Baron Hutt, adopted 
procedures that involved responding to comments submitted to it 
and an approach to transparency that involved making as much 
                                                          
rules, see Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review 
of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1075–82 (1986) and John D. 
Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of the Bush 
Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 960–75 (2006). 
9 CHARLES O. ROSSOTTI, MANY UNHAPPY RETURNS: ONE MAN’S QUEST TO 
TURN AROUND THE MOST UNPOPULAR ORGANIZATION IN AMERICA 134–36 
(2005); Hal G. Rainey & James Thompson, Leadership and the Transformation 
of a Major Institution: Charles Rossotti and the Internal Revenue Service, 66 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 596, 599–600 (2006). 
10 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 
Pub. Law 105-206, July 22, 1998, available at http://www.gpo.gov:80/ 
fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ206/pdf/PLAW-105publ206.pdf.  
11 ROSSOTTI, supra note 9, at 129–30. 
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information as possible publicly available.12  
Often, we assume that agencies are the villains in the 
“accountability game,” the quest to be accountable. Much of the 
literature about accountability sees agencies as obstacles. It is often 
taken for granted that agencies will avoid accountability as much 
as they can, and that pressure to accept accountability will be 
required as a matter of course. Other scholars, in response, 
emphasize the multiple and conflicting pressures for accountability 
placed on agencies, and see them as victims of too much 
accountability. This approach sees agencies as merely passive 
actors in this area, subjected to accountability mechanisms against 
their will and with no real control or influence on their 
accountability environment.  
While there is much truth to both perspectives, they each miss 
an important part of the picture. As the examples above suggest, 
agencies are not always the enemies of accountability. Nor are they 
always helpless, passive pawns, crushed under the oppressive 
weight of accountability. Agencies can also be autonomous and 
important actors in the accountability game, creating new forms of 
accountability, or accepting and adapting pre-existing forms. They 
often willingly join in and strive to be accountable. They may well 
invest substantial efforts in increasing their accountability.  
Not all agencies do this all the time, and not all agencies do it 
well. But in today’s administrative environment, agencies need 
accountability, and being sophisticated actors, they work at 
achieving it. Their efforts happen for a number of reasons—
internal and external—and not just because of cost/benefit 
considerations.  
This Article examines such actions by agencies and addresses 
the reasons they take the actions they do. Following this 
introduction, the article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides the 
background, reviewing current literature and demonstrating the 
tendency to place agencies in either the villain or the victim camp, 
as well as discussing the very few studies that focus on agencies’ 
own contribution to the accountability regime surrounding them. 
Part II reiterates that agencies seek accountability and addresses 
                                                          
12 See infra Part III.A.   
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possible explanations for such behavior. The explanations 
highlighted are rational choice (agencies seek to be accountable 
because the costs of not being accountable are too high), power of 
ideas, and internalization of the idea that accountability is part of 
the administrative agents’ mission. Part III provides a small 
number of more detailed case studies of agencies which sought to 
increase their accountability, and includes examples from the FDA, 
the IRS, and the EPA. This discussion shows that the phenomenon 
is a real and common one, and provides empirical support for the 
explanations addressed in Part II for this behavior. Finally, Part IV 
discusses implications for theory and practice of accountability in 
the administrative state.  
I. BACKGROUND: ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Accountability of administrative agencies is an ongoing 
concern in the administrative state. Agencies exercise tremendous 
power and engage in numerous activities.13 Not surprisingly, 
controlling them has been a constant preoccupation of scholars, 
politicians, and citizens, and an extensive literature discussing 
                                                          
13 See, e.g., KENNETH J. MEIER, POLITICS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: 
POLICYMAKING IN THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 2 (3d ed. 1992):  
Today’s citizens awake in the morning to breakfasts of bacon and eggs, 
both certified as fit for consumption by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (although the Department of Health and Human Services 
would urge you to eat a breakfast lower in cholesterol). Breakfast is 
rudely interrupted by a phone call; the cost of phone service is 
determined by a state regulatory commission. When our citizens drive 
to work, their cars’ emissions are controlled by a catalytic converter 
mandated by the Environmental Protection Agency. The cars have seat 
belts, padded dashboards, collapsible steering columns and air bags 
required by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. When 
our citizens stop for gasoline, they pay a price that is partly determined 
by the energy policies (or a lack thereof) administered by the 
Department of Energy. To take their minds off the bureaucracies 
regulating their lives, the bureaucratic citizens turn on their radios. 
Each radio station is licensed by the Federal Communications 
Commission, and all advertising is subject to the rules and regulations 
of the Federal Trade Commission. 
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accountability exists.14 This “accountability literature” has covered 
much ground and taught us much; however, it tends to treat the 
accountability environment the agencies face as something that 
agencies either manipulate to achieve their goals or something to 
which they are subject. In the terms mentioned above, it tends to 
treat agencies as either villains or victims.15  
                                                          
14 Here is a small sample of studies with the word “accountability” or 
“accountable” in the title from the last thirty years: ROBERT D. BEHN, 
RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2001); PATRICIA DAY & 
RUDOLPH KLEIN, ACCOUNTABILITIES: FIVE PUBLIC SERVICES (1987); PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES (Michael W. Dowdle 
ed. 2006); BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR. & STEVEN J. BALLA, 
BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY: ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE (2d 
ed. 2004); CAROL HARLOW, ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002); 
Giandomenico Majone, Independence vs. Accountability: Non-Majoritarian 
Institutions and Democratic Government in Europe (European Univ. Inst., 
Working Paper No. 3, 1994); BERYL A. RADIN, THE ACCOUNTABLE JUGGLER 
(2002); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic Accountability and the 
Anti-Administrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS 
AND EXPERIENCES, supra, at 52; Robert S. Gilmour & Laura S. Jensen, 
Reinventing Government Accountability: Public Functions, Privatization, and 
the Meaning of “State Action,” 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 247 (1998); Jonathan G. 
S. Koppell, Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of 
“Multiple Accountabilities Disorder,” 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 94 (2005); Peter J. 
May, Regulatory Regimes and Accountability, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 8 (2007); 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003); Peter M. Shane, 
Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of 
Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995); Edward P. 
Weber, The Question of Accountability in Historical Perspective: From Jackson 
to Contemporary Grassroots Ecosystem Management, 31 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 451 
(1999); William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, 
Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An 
Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66 (2004). These are not, of 
course, the only ones and do not really cover all the studies about accountability 
that do not use the term in the title. 
15 This terminology is inspired by, though it is not directly drawing on, 
Julian Le Grand’s classification of the way those drawing and operating the 
welfare state are viewed. See Julian Le Grand, Knights, Knaves or Pawns? 
Human Behavior and Social Policy, 26 J. SOC. POL’Y 149, 153–60 (1992) 
(describing how loss of faith in the welfare state led to seeing the officials 
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A. Agencies as the Villains  
Much of the writing about agencies today portrays them as the 
enemy, or the villain, of the accountability story. There are several 
varieties of this approach. The most neutral one, the one least 
hostile to agencies, explains the need for accountability as a 
principal-agent problem: Congress created agencies to do its 
bidding. Agencies may have their own interests and prefer to 
follow their own preferences16 (or the preferences of the industries 
they are captured by)17 rather than follow the wishes of Congress. 
                                                          
administering it as “knaves” instead of “knights” and the people drawing 
benefits as “knaves” instead of “pawns”). 
16 See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition 
to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (2003) (utilizing an 
empirical study of ESA to undermine the traditional principal agency 
relationship between Congress and government agencies); John D. DiIulio, Jr., 
Principled Agents: The Cultural Bases of Behavior in a Federal Government 
Bureaucracy, 4 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 277 (1994) (critiquing the 
principal agent model of bureaucratic behavior from the perspective of the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 248–
49 (1987) [hereinafter McCubbins, Administrative Procedures] (advocating 
“oversight” and “administrative procedures” as a means to control bureaucratic 
decisions); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Policy and 
Politics: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 
VA. L. REV. 431, 432–33 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins, Structure and 
Process] (identifying and analyzing the problem of effective political control of 
an agency). 
17 See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE 
POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 18–22 (2008); Tim Bartley 
& Marc Schneiberg, Rationality and Institutional Contingency: The Varying 
Politics of Economic Regulation in the Fire Insurance Industry, 45 SOC. PERSP. 
47, 47 (2002) (proposing that government agencies act according to their 
connected industries as a result of being “defined” by those industries); Michael 
E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the 
Public Agenda. Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG 167 (1990) (striving 
“to fit public interest characterizations into the social science literature to make 
them operationally usable and testable”); James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference 
in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished 
Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939 (2008) [hereinafter O’Reilly, 
Losing Deference] (identifiying the diminished deference to the FDA as a result 
of the Bush administration’s policital control of the agency); Sidney A. Shapiro 
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Without accountability, agencies would be free to go their own 
ways and ignore Congress. Under this theory, scholars of the 
administrative state should address mechanisms of oversight over 
agencies, examine them, evaluate them, and suggest 
improvements.18  
A more extreme version of the agencies as villains narrative 
focuses, instead, on examples of agency abuse and misconduct and 
uses that to demonstrate that agencies, whenever they can, make 
                                                          
& Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1741, 1742 (2008) (advocating the use of the internet to hold agencies 
accountable for their failures and successes). 
18 Some of this literature focuses on Congressional oversight. See, e.g., B. 
DAN WOOD & RICHARD W.  WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE 
OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 33–35 (1994) (seeking to dispel the “myth” 
of unresponsive bureaucracy while suggesting additional Congressional 
oversight); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 
825–29 (1988) (analyzing the trend toward Congressional control); Barry R. 
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? 
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 
765, 766 (1983) (amending the regulatory approach by “incorporating the 
legislature” into the process). Some of it examines oversight by the president. 
See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4 (Yale Univ. 
Press 2008) (advocating for executive oversight by arguing against the 
constitutionality of Congress’ efforts to insulate executive control with 
government agencies); DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF 
AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
BUREAUCRACY 1946–1997, 26–28 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (arguing that the 
agency model is a product of politics and an irrational plan for administration); 
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246, 
2248–50, 2277–82 (2001) (supporting the concept of presidential control over 
regulatory agencies to achieve positive objectives). Some of it focuses on the 
courts. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking 
Process—For Better or Worse, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 469, 473–77 (2008) 
[hereinafter Lubbers, The Transformation] (criticizing both Congress and the 
President and emphasizing the role of the courts based on the diminishing 
activity during the note and comment period); McCubbins, Administrative 
Procedures, supra note 16, at 243; Gregory L. Ogden, Analysis of Three Current 
Trends in Administrative Law: Reducing Administrative Delay, Expanding 
Public Participation, and Increasing Agency Accountability, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 
553, 556–79 (1979–1980). 
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themselves as unaccountable as possible and actively avoid the 
control mechanisms put in place by others. Many of these studies 
therefore suggest increased controls or improved enforcement of 
existing controls.  
For example, in a number of recent studies, scholars have 
demonstrated that agencies avoid some of the procedures put in 
place by the APA. In a very recent article, Michael Kolber 
demonstrated that the FDA tended to use the procedure known as 
“direct final rulemaking,” in which an agency publishes a rule 
without going through the notice and comment process 
beforehand,19  not as it was intended, i.e., for non-controversial 
rules where notice and comment is a waste of time,20 but instead 
for rules expected to be controversial.21 These findings about the 
FDA are also reflected in an article by Lars Noah criticizing that 
agency for cavalierly ignoring legal and statutory requirements22 
(even though Noah acknowledges that these “subversive” actions 
are part of the reason the agency has done “fairly well” in 
protecting the public health in the face of limited resources, 
                                                          
19 For a general discussion of direct final rulemaking, see Ronald M. Levin, 
Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1995) (detailing the history 
and analyzing the strengths of direct final rulemaking), and Ronald M. Levin, 
More on Direct Final Rulemaking: Streamlining, Not Corner-Cutting, 51 
ADMIN. L. REV. 757 (1999) [hereinafter Levin, More on Direct Final 
Rulemaking] (defending direct final rulemaking and emphasizing the necessity 
for restraint instead of abandonment). In a critical vein, see Lars Noah, Doubts 
About Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 401 (1999) (arguing that the 
procedure of direct final rulemaking is invalid under existing law). 
20 The point of direct final rulemaking is to do away with notice and 
comment in cases where there will be no comments submitted because the rule 
is non-controversial. See Levin, More on Direct Final Rulemaking, supra note 
19, at 758–60. For further discussion of the waste of time resulting from use of 
notice and comment in certain cases, see Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored 
Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321 (2009) [hereinafter Reiss, Tailored Participation].  
21 Michael Strauss Kolber, Direct Final Rulemaking in the FDA: Lessons 
from the First Decade 4, 23 (June 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121550. 
22 Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to 
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 903–05 
(2008). 
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controversial issues, lack of leadership, and problematic legislative 
directives).23 In a similar vein, Kristine Hickman, in a recent 
article, demonstrated that the Treasury does not follow the APA 
notice and comment rulemaking procedures in over 40 percent of 
its rulemakings.24  
Likewise, Ashutosh Bhagwat demonstrated that the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) for a decade labeled its 
actions in relation to tariffs “enforcement policy” rather than 
acknowledging it was rulemaking.25 Using the Chaney doctrine,26 
it was therefore able to avoid judicial review until the D.C. Circuit 
finally called it on the issue.27 
Other studies used analysis rather than empirical methods to 
make the same points. For example, one writer claims that 
“government has no sense of accountability.”28 Dobkin, focusing 
on the Immigration and Naturalization Services, sees agencies as 
lacking accountability by acting behind the scenes, which leads to 
“lawlessness.”29 
These are the type of studies that resonate most powerfully 
outside the academic community, mostly because they reflect 
stories of abuse that come up in the news and fit the general 
American tendency to distrust bureaucrats.  
For example, in 2007 the Inspector General of the Department 
of the Interior started expressing concerns about the operations of 
the Department’s Minerals Management Service, an agency that 
collects government royalties from oil companies drilling on public 
lands. The Inspector General’s initial concern was that since the 
                                                          
23 Id. at 902–03. 
24 Kristine E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s 
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking 
Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1748–52 (2007). 
25 Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 
168–69 (1996). 
26 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
27 Bhagwat, supra note 25, at 169–70. 
28 Malcolm Wallop, The Centralization of Power and Government 
Unaccountability, 4 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487 (1995).  
29  Donald S. Dobkin, The Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription 
for Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 362, 367, 385 (2008). 
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Clinton administration, the agency has allowed oil companies to 
underpay.30 Later investigations showed a culture of accepting 
gifts from industry representatives, sexual relationships with 
representatives from oil and gas companies (and it’s not often you 
find an agency literally in bed with the regulated industry), and 
abuse of alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana in industry-organized 
parties.31 While the newspaper reports treated it as a classic 
example of lack of accountability, it should be remembered that it 
was an internal administrative control that discovered all this—the 
Department of the Interior’s own Inspector General, Earl E. 
Devaney—and it was the administrative machine that stepped in to 
punish the problem agency.32  
The same department’s lack of accountability was severely 
criticized during the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The agency 
was criticized for not exercising sufficient oversight over the 
operations of British Petroleum (BP), the company owning the 
well that spilled over. Once again, the government—specifically, 
the Department of the Interior—took corrective steps, and very 
extreme ones. The agency was substantially reformed, and the 
reforms included a fundamental restructuring. For example, a 
royalty-in-kind program subject to many abuses was abolished, an 
independent Marine Board was ordered to review the agency’s 
inspection program for offshore facilities, and inspections of 
deepwater operations were ordered.33  
                                                          
30 Report Reveals Distrust in Royalties Agency, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 
2007, at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119077573820539 
676.html. 
31 Stephen Power, Federal Oil Officials Accused in Sex and Drugs Scandal, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 
122107135333120223.html; Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in 
Interior Department, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/washington/11royalty.html?scp=1&sq=dep
artment%20interior%20orgies%20drugs&st=cse.  
32 See Power, supra note 31. 
33 See Press Release: Salazar Launches Safety and Environmental 
Protection Reforms to Toughen Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations, 
U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR (May 11, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/news/press 
releases/Salazar-Launches-Safety-and-Environmental-Protection-Reforms-to-
Toughen-Oversight-of-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Operations.cfm (describing the 
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Scholars are not the only ones adhering to the “agency as 
accountability villains” story. Politicians regularly attack agencies 
for their lack of accountability. That, for example, was at the heart 
of Representative Elliot Levitas’ strong promotion of the 
legislative veto, which would have given Congress control over 
agency rules. 34 The same view was at the heart of the new and 
vigorous attempts to reintroduce the “Regulations from the 
Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act” promoted by, for 
example, Congressman Geoff Davis, that would require all major 
rules to be approved by a Congressional Joint Resolution before 
they became operative.35 In a completely different example 
Nebraska Democratic Senator Ben Nelson, concerned about money 
withheld from the University of Nebraska, described it as 
“unaccountable Federal bureaucrats diverting millions of dollars 
into agency ‘slush funds.’”36  
In the discussions leading to the enactment of the IRS 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,37 Senator Frank 
Murkowski from Alaska said that “[f]ederal agencies tend to act as 
if they are a law unto themselves, believing they are accountable to 
no one. . . . [T]he system was designed to avoid accountability.”38 
The studies of agencies as accountability villains capture an 
                                                          
reforms). 
34 BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 149–50 (1990); JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE 
DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 324, 353 (1981). 
35 See Congressman Davis’ personal website at CONGRESSMAN GEOFF 
DAVIS, http://geoffdavis.house.gov/Legislation/reins.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 
2011). The bill itself was presented as H.R. 10 to the 112 Congress. Details can 
be found at: H.R. 10– Regulations From the Executive in Need of Security Act of 
2011, OPEN CONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-h10/show (last 
visited February 24, 2011).  
36 Ron Nixon, Not All Earmarks Are Paid in Full, and a Senator Wants to 
Know Why, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2008/05/20/washington/20earmark.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=unaccountable
%20administrative%20agencies&st=cse. 
37 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998). 
38 IRS Oversight, Hearings Before the Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. 9 
(1998) (statement of Sen. Frank S. Murkowski, Alaska). 
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important part of the truth; abuses occur in the administrative 
state—some that clearly cannot be justified, such as the behavior 
of the Minerals Management Service—but others which might be 
looked upon as making the best of a bad situation. There are times 
when the only way to get a job done is to bend some rules, given 
the complex situations that sometimes face agencies. Consider, for 
example, the FDA’s behavior described by Noah, which could be 
seen as the only way for the agency to actually get its job done in 
the face of severe financial and staffing constraints.39  But this is 
not the whole picture. 
B. Agencies as Victims  
A completely different view of agency accountability 
emphasizes the problematic nature of accountability in the 
American administrative state, focusing on an alleged excess of 
accountability mechanisms. Scholars who take this view do not 
deny that there are abuses by agencies.40 However, they suggest 
that it is more common to find a well meaning, hard working 
administration assailed from all sides by demands and accusations, 
so that simply doing its assigned job becomes extremely difficult.  
The more neutral of these studies describe the complexity of 
the administrative state and address how agencies deal with that 
complexity. For example, in their study of public administration, 
Romzek and Dubnick offer a classic typology of accountability—
bureaucratic, professional, political, and legal.41 This well-accepted 
classification42 distinguishes between types of accountability on 
                                                          
39 Noah, supra note 22, at 902–903. 
40 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1398 (1992) [hereinafter McGarity, 
Some Thoughts]. 
41 MELVIN J. DUBNICK & BARBARA S. ROMZEK, AMERICAN PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION: POLITICS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS 77–82 
(1991) [hereinafter DUBNICK & ROMZEK, AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION]; 
Barbara S. Romzek & Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability in the Public Sector: 
Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 227, 228–29 
(1987). 
42 For examples of use, see Mark Bovens, Public Accountability, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 182, 185 (Edwin Ferlie, 
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two dimensions: whether the degree of control exercised by the 
accountability holder is high or low, and whether the source of 
control is external or internal.  
Based on these two dimensions Dubnick and Romzek identify 
four possible types of accountability.43 Bureaucratic (also known 
as hierarchical) accountability refers to a high degree of control 
exercised within the agency or within the executive branch—by 
other agencies, the White House, and the President. It is 
hierarchical in nature. It includes, but is not limited to, relations 
between lower agency officials and higher agency officials. 
Professional accountability is internal but involves a low degree of 
control—it emphasizes professional norms and reputational 
mechanisms to control experts who require discretion to do their 
job. Legal accountability involves a high level of control exercised 
by an external actor; for agencies, this includes control by courts 
and Congress, through legislation or the budget. Finally, political 
accountability refers to a low level of control exercised by an 
external actor—for example, influence or pressure exerted by 
Congress-members, the media, and interest groups. Agencies face 
all these forms of accountability simultaneously and have to 
respond to them. The science of public administration, say 
Dubnick and Romzek, is the science of managing conflicting 
expectations.  
Similarly, Radin discusses the challenges facing agencies when 
they try to deal with the accountability apparatus by examining a 
hypothetical new head of the Department of Health and Human 
Service and his ability to juggle the conflicting accountability 
demands he faces in his new job.44  
Hargrove and Glidewell ask how officials deal with 
“Impossible Jobs,” where the “clients” (e.g., welfare recipients, 
                                                          
Laurence E. Lynne & Christopher Pollitt eds., 2005); WILLIAM T. GORMLEY JR. 
& STEVEN J. BALLA, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY: ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
PERFORMANCE 11–12 (2004); BERYL A. RADIN, CHALLENGING THE 
PERFORMANCE MOVEMENT: ACCOUNTABILITY, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRATIC 
VALUES 55–56 (2006).  
43 See DUBNICK & ROMZEK, AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, supra 
note 41, at 77–82. 
44  RADIN, THE ACCOUNTABLE JUGGLER, supra note 14, at 10–11, 22–24. 
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prisoners) are not considered very sympathetic, and where there is 
high conflict among interested constituencies and little confidence 
in the profession and the agency.45 There are many other 
examples.46 
Other studies go further and argue that the intense 
accountability pressures agencies face have severe negative 
repercussions for the administrative state and the public interest. In 
his study of accountability, Behn suggests that the multiplicity of 
accountability mechanisms leads agencies to be blamed regardless 
of what they do, and that this excess blame can lead to a range of 
negative results—from defensive behavior to despair.47 
Similarly, Kagan, in his book Adversarial Legalism, tracks the 
problematic effects of the decentralized, multilayered system of 
government in the United States on making public policy.48 For 
example, he describes how the involvement of multiple actors—
several federal and state agencies, as well as federal and state 
courts—made the dredging of the Port of Oakland very slow, much 
more costly than anticipated, thus costing the city of Oakland jobs 
and revenues.49 He acknowledges that adversarial legalism has 
benefits—making the system more open to new claims and more 
                                                          
45 ERWIN C.  HARGROVE & JOHN C.  GLIDEWELL, IMPOSSIBLE JOBS IN 
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 5–8 (1990). 
46 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: 
Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: 
DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES, supra note 14, at 115, 120–22; 
BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 
179–204 (3d ed. 1998); Dorit Rubenstein Reiss, Agency Accountability 
Strategies After Liberalization: Universal Service in the United Kingdom, 
France, and Sweden, 31 L. & POL’Y 111, 113–15 (2009) [hereinafter Reiss, 
Agency Accountability]; Dorit Rubinstein, Regulatory Accountability:  
Telecommunications and Electricity Agencies in the UK, France and Sweden 
(2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley) (on file 
with author). 
47 BEHN, supra note 14, at 1–6 (discussing the phenomenon); id. at 69–72 
(discussing some of the negative impacts).  
48 ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
LAW 43 (2001). 
49 To such an extent it became uncertain whether the port would actually be 
dredged, costing Oakland’s port further business. Id. at 27–30. 
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accessible.50 However, at least when it comes to regulation, Kagan 
strongly suggests that the costs of adversarial legalism outweigh 
the potential benefits.51 
The debate about “ossification” of the rulemaking process is 
another example of studies warning against the negative effects of 
excess accountability. In a famous and very strongly written 
article, Thomas McGarity criticized the complexities added to the 
rulemaking process as harmful to the functionality of the 
administrative state.52 In a subsequent article, he emphasized that it 
is unrealistic to tie agencies’ hands so thoroughly while expecting 
them to deliver and be effective.53 He also emphasized that the 
extensive accountability used undermines the agencies’ efforts to 
protect the public from the harms they were designed to combat.54 
Other scholars expressed similar concerns,55 though recent 
empirical studies have cast doubts on the extent to which agency 
rulemaking is indeed ossified by having too much accountability 
forced upon them.56 
                                                          
50 Id. at 31–32. 
51 Id. at 196–204. 
52 See McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 40, at 1448–59. 
53 See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of 
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 525–26 
(1997).   
54 Id. at 530–33. 
55 See generally Lubbers, The Transformation, supra note 18, at 474–475; 
JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 
(1990); E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490 (1992); 
Ronald M. Levine, More on Direct Final Rulemaking: Streamlining, Not 
Corner-Cutting, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 757 (1999); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 62–65 
(1995). 
56 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An 
Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 932 
(2008); William S. Jordan III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and 
Capricious Review Significantly Interfere With Agency Ability to Achieve 
Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 439–
40 (2000); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative 
Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making 
“Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261, available at http://jpart. 
oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/mup011v1. 
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The common thread that runs through all of these studies is the 
idea that agencies, subject to extensive accountability mechanisms, 
are often unfairly blamed for problems not of their own making, 
serve as politicians and scholars’ whipping boys, and have trouble 
doing their jobs. As with the “agencies as villains” narratives, these 
studies capture a part of the picture, but ignore another. It is to this 
missing link I turn now. 
C. Agencies as Accountability Initiators 
The part of the picture that current literature underemphasizes 
is the role of agencies as sophisticated actors managing their own 
accountability environment by creating and adding accountability 
mechanisms.  
Public administration scholars acknowledge agencies acting 
autonomously in other contexts. For example, Carpenter describes 
in detail how several agencies created their own autonomous 
policies and managed to get the legislation they wanted from 
Congress by building a reputation for competence and for 
supporting the public interest.57 A focus on agency action or 
agency discretion, implicitly acknowledging that agencies have 
freedom to act, is at the core of most studies of public 
administration and the problem the “agencies as villains” narrative 
confronts.58 
However, these insights have not been applied to the study of 
accountability—i.e., so far agencies have not been treated as 
autonomous actors that can create and contribute to their 
accountability environment. 
One paper that stands out as an exception is Elizabeth Magill’s 
                                                          
57 See generally DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN 
EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001). 
58 For some examples of studies that focus on agency discretion, see GARY 
C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL 
REGULATORY AGENCIES (Richard A. Brody et al. eds., 1987); JERRY L. 
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM AN INTERNAL 
PERSPECTIVE 71–72 (1983); Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, Image IV 
Revisited: Executive and Political Roles, 1 GOVERNANCE 1 (1988). 
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recent study of self-regulation.59 Magill examines agencies’ 
voluntary adoption of regulations that limit their discretion.60 She 
makes an important contribution to the literature by taking a clear, 
unbiased view of agencies’ activities and by emphasizing the 
agencies’ role in creating the regulatory environment they operate 
in.   
Many of the limits agencies adopt through self-regulation may 
be seen as reforms that increase accountability—but not all.61 And 
since Magill emphasizes, for most of her discussion, self-
regulation activities that were actually embedded in agency rules—
which will therefore be enforced by the courts under the Accardi 
principle62—some of the efforts agencies make to increase their 
accountability are not captured by her discussion, such as the IRIS 
system mentioned in the introduction to this Article. More 
importantly, her methodology—an analytical discussion—is 
dramatically different from the qualitative empirical description 
based on case studies used in this Article. Also, her explanations 
for why agencies adopt self-regulation focus mostly on what I 
describe as “rational choice” explanations, and are therefore more 
limited than those used here.63 
This Article adds to the literature by suggesting that agencies 
also act voluntarily to increase their accountability; moreover, it 
provides detailed case studies of such behavior. Agencies do so for 
a number of reasons, including their self-interest, but also due to 
the power of ideas brought in by appointees from outside the civil 
service and to the role conception of the civil servants.  
One challenge a claim like this faces is how to define 
accountability. The word “accountability” suffers from overuse 
and misuse, and scholars have expressed concerns about the term 
                                                          
59 See generally Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 859 (2009). 
60 Id. at 861.  
61 See infra text accompanying notes 125–32 for examples of reforms that 
increase accountability.  
62 According to which agencies are bound by their own regulations. Magill, 
supra note 59, at 877–81. 
63 Id. at 884–91.  
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losing its meaning.64 It has been defined as covering electoral 
accountability,65 punishment,66 or control of one party by 
another.67 Very broadly, cognitive psychology scholars see 
accountability as:  
[an] implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called 
on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to 
others . . . [It] also usually implies that people who do not 
provide a satisfactory justification for their actions will 
suffer negative consequences ranging from disdainful looks 
to loss of one’s livelihood, liberty, or even life . . . . 
Conversely, people who do provide compelling 
justifications will experience positive consequences . . . . 68 
To solve the problem of defining accountability, I am focusing 
my discussion on two types of reforms that agencies often adopt: 
increasing their transparency and increasing their responsiveness to 
external actors. Increasing transparency is often suggested as a 
means of increasing accountability69 and allowing external actors 
                                                          
64 BEHN, supra note 14, at 2–3; Bovens, supra note 42, at 182; Richard 
Mulgan, ‘Accountability’: An Ever-Expanding Concept?, 78 PUB. ADMIN. 555, 
555–56 (2000); Melvin J. Dubnick, Professor, Rutgers University–Newark, 
Seeking Salvation for Accountability,  Delivered at 2002 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association (Aug. 29–Sept. 1, 2002), available at 
http://mjdubnick.dubnick.net/papers/2002/salv2002.pdf.  
65 See, e.g., KENNETH J. MEIER & LAURENCE J. O’TOOLE, JR., 
BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE: A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE 12 
(2006); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW 
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 102–03 (1993); see 
generally Wallop, supra note 28. 
66 BEHN, supra note 14, at 3.  
67 Id. at 14–16. 
68 Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of 
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255 (1999). Although developed in 
relation to studies of individuals, the definition has been used in relation to 
agencies before. Reiss, Agency Accountability, supra note 46, at 114 n.1; Mark 
Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency 
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1064 n.26 (2001). 
69 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1249, 1254 (2008) (grouping transparency with accountability as part of a 
whole); Christopher Hood, What Happens When Transparency Meets Blame-
Avoidance?, 9 PUB. MGMT. REV. 191, 192–93 (2007); Koppell, supra note 14, at 
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more of a say increases control, as well as the threat of sanctions.70 
Therefore, reforms in which agencies increase their transparency 
or the influence of other actors can be taken with some confidence 
as examples of efforts to increase accountability.  
II. AGENCIES WANT TO BE ACCOUNTABLE 
If, as I argue, some agencies want to be accountable, the 
question remains, why? This part of the Article suggests some 
explanations, which are supported by the case studies detailed in 
Part III. I will draw on several strands of literature about the 
administrative state, as well as on general features of agencies, and 
examine three strong motivators that can create a quest for 
accountability within an agency. The first focuses on what we may 
term the “rational choice model”—i.e., efforts by an agency to 
minimize costs arising out of a successful accusation of lack of 
accountability, and to maximize the benefits to itself that derive 
from accountability.71 However, other explanations are just as 
persuasive; this Article examines two of those alternative 
explanations. 
One explanation is based on the power of ideas, and 
specifically upon agencies’ acceptance of new ideas about the 
importance of transparency and participation—ideas drawn from 
practitioners, consultants, and scholars which have become 
prevalent in the world of governance. The second is based on 
agencies’ role conception. This explanation claims that in today’s 
world, bureaucrats have internalized the need to be accountable as 
part of their mission and role conception, and invest in 
accountability as an integral part of doing their job. In a sense, 
these explanations overlap, but there is an important difference in 
                                                          
96 (characterizing transparency as a dimension of accountability); May, supra 
note 14, at 11–12 (characterizing transparency as increasing accountability). 
70 See generally West, supra note 14 (equating participation with 
accountability throughout); see also Camilla Stivers, The Listening Bureaucrat: 
Responsiveness in Public Administration, 54 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 364, 367 (1994) 
(stating that responsiveness to the public promotes accountability). 
71 This, for example, is the argument suggested to explain the EPA’s 
behavior in Part III.B. 
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the “target audience” on which they focus. As the case studies 
suggest, ideas are frequently brought into an agency through the 
appointment of outsiders. Peter Hutt came to the FDA from private 
practice, Richard Merrill from academia, and Charles Rossotti was 
a businessman before becoming commissioner of the IRS. All 
three were strongly committed to transparency in a way that the 
staff may not have been at the time they came in.  
However, sometimes separately and sometimes as a response 
to the reform, ideas can also be internalized by the agency’s civil 
servants, those who run day-to-day operations of the agency. In 
that case we are talking about role conception. It’s not just about 
the power of the idea itself; the issue becomes the way the civil 
servant sees her job, a matter of duty rather than ideology. Even 
before the 1998 reform, several of the IRS staff members were 
promoting increased transparency; they had, apparently, 
internalized the ideas of transparency as part of their role. Even 
more striking, after the reforms introduced by Hutt were 
implemented, there were some FDA officials who wanted to go 
further in transparency than he did. Such occurrences seem to 
reflect a redefinition of the officials’ roles in their own minds. All 
three of these explanations have some applicability to the case 
studies in Part III.  
A. Rational Choice: Agencies Want to be Accountable to 
Maximize Benefits and Minimize Harm 
The rational choice paradigm as it applies to agencies sees 
bureaucrats as self-interested utility maximizers.72 The classical 
approach posits that bureaucrats seek to maximize their budget.73 
However, more recent approaches add in bureaucrats’ desire to 
maximize preferred policy outcomes.74  
                                                          
72 See, e.g., CROLEY, supra note 17, at 49; WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., 
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36–38 (1st paperback prtg. 
2007). See generally Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative 
Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 305 (1972). 
73  NISKANEN, supra note 72, at 40–41. 
74 Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, 
Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 874 
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While there has been substantial criticism of rational choice 
theory as not empirically grounded and in tension with the realities 
of the administrative state,75 in the context of accountability, there 
is some indication in the case studies and in current literature that 
agencies do act to increase their accountability because of a cost-
benefit analysis.  
In the last decades governments have suffered from a 
legitimacy crisis.76 Trust in government has been dropping 
substantially.77 The perception of a legitimacy crisis easily leads to 
increased pressure on agencies to be accountable and more and 
more efforts are put into holding them accountable. The large 
amount of literature on accountability in the last decades78 
demonstrates how important the issue has become. In a sense, the 
administrative state today is the administrative state under attack.79 
In this environment, agencies pay a very high price for an 
accusation of lack of accountability that sticks. All the agencies 
                                                          
(2007); Michael M. Ting, The “Power of the Purse” and Its Implications for 
Bureaucratic Policy-Making, 106 PUB. CHOICE 243, 245 (2001). Much of the 
literature also focuses on the political side of the equation, examining efforts by 
political branches to control the administration, treating bureaucrats as having 
no say in the design of institutions. See, e.g., John D.  Huber & Charles R.  
Shipan, The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs, 25 
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 25, 25–27 (2000); B. Dan Wood & John Bohte, Political 
Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design, 66 J. POL. 176, 
179–182 (2004). 
75 See, e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL 
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, 34–46 
(1994); RUTH HOOGLAND DEHOOG, CONTRACTING OUT FOR HUMAN SERVICES 
21 (1984); Gary J. Miller & Terry M. Moe, Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the 
Size of Government, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 297 (1983); Terry M. Moe & Scott 
A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1, 1–2 (1994); Diane Vaughan, Rational Choice, Situated Action, and 
the Social Control of Organizations, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 23, 26–27 (1998). 
76 THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS 
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 167–69 (1969). MICHAEL W. DOWDLE, Public Accountability: 
conceptual, Historical, and Epistemic Mappings in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, 
DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 1,1 (Michael W.  Dowdle ed., 2006). 
77 Kenneth P. Ruscio, Trust, Democracy, and Public Management: A 
Theoretical Argument, 6 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 461, 462 (1996). 
78 See supra note 14.  
79 Rubin, supra note 14, at 74–75. 
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described in Part III were agencies under attack, and there are 
indications that they tried to increase accountability to reduce 
pressure and prevent negative consequences. Claims of lack of 
accountability are often raised to justify demands to reform 
agencies, cut their budget, change the governing legislation, or 
other adverse consequences. For example, the IRS’s reorganization 
of 1998 was motivated at least in part by complaints that the IRS 
was not sufficiently accountable to Congress.80 Agencies naturally 
want to avoid such consequences. At the very least, not being 
accountable can mean another actor will add accountability 
mechanisms, and as demonstrated in Part I.C, agencies already 
face a plethora of them; these demands add work and take up 
resources that can be used elsewhere; what sane bureaucrat would 
want more of them imposed from the outside?81 No wonder, then, 
that administrators and agencies want to demonstrate that they are 
accountable and do not fall into the category of “evil,” 
unaccountable bureaucrats.   
This is the main argument Magill uses in her article; she 
describes agency self-regulation as motivated by a rational desire 
to increase the benefits to the agency.82 The reasons she suggests 
include giving agency heads the ability to control lower officials to 
whom they delegate authority;83 clarifying the problem internally 
and helping bureaucrats explain their decisions;84 publicizing an 
agency’s policy and offering stronger commitment;85 limiting 
future changes of policy following a change of administration;86 
protecting agency autonomy against intervention from political 
                                                          
80 See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON RESTRUCTURING THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., A VISION FOR A NEW IRS (1997). 
81 See BEHN, supra note 14, at 14–15. Behn gives the example of the rules 
adopted by government procurement officials, observed by scholar Steven 
Kelman to add complexity to the process to avoid legal protest or political 
challenges. See id. at 15. 
82 Magill, supra note 59, at 884–91. 
83 Id. at 884–86. 
84 Id. at 887. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 888. 
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actors;87 and increasing production of collective goods as 
information and reputation.88 
Some of these reasons apply to agency measures increasing 
accountability. Increased accountability can limit the illicit power 
of any one actor by forcing the agency to make the basis of its 
decisions clear, and thus protect agencies against political 
interference.  In addition, it may make it harder to change existing 
policy; may provide the higher ranks of the agency with more 
information about what the rest of the agency is doing; and may 
increase its reputation.  
B. Pantouflage:89 The Power of Ideas and the Role of Political 
Appointees  
However, on its own, the cost/benefit argument is insufficient, 
for two reasons. First, a strong cost/benefit argument can also be 
made that suggests agencies should want to avoid accountability 
and not add to the already existing complicated system they face, 
an argument commonly made.90 That’s one of the arguments the 
“agencies as villains” story draws on. For example, one of Paul 
Light’s interviewees said about the desire of Presidential 
administrations for a strong inspector general: “Everybody wants a 
strong IG operation until it starts investigating them. The 
administration may start out thinking they want junkyard dogs and 
                                                          
87 Id. at 889.  
88 Id. at 890–91.  
89 The term Pantouflage is taken from studies of French public 
administration and refers to the prevalent practice of the senior elite trained in 
the most prestigious schools moving back and forth between the public and 
private sectors. Luc Rouban, The Administrative and Political Elites, in PASCAL 
PERRINEAU & LUC ROUBAN, POLITICS IN FRANCE AND EUROPE 121, 132 (2009). 
The United States parallel is that one way to maintain connections and flow of 
ideas between the private and public sector is through personnel exchange, 
appointing people with previous private sector background to senior positions in 
the public service. This is somewhat similar to the United States concept of 
“revolving door.”  
90 See McCubbins, Administrative Procedures, supra note 16, at 248–49; 
see also BEHN, supra note 14, at 15; Dobkin, supra note 29, at 379–82; Hood, 
supra note 69, at 192. 
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what they end up getting is French poodles.”91  
Second, while a rational choice explanation may explain why 
an agency chooses to work toward increased accountability, it says 
nothing about the choice of method. Nor does it explain the level 
of commitment some agencies show to the accountability 
endeavor. In a world in which government agencies have limited 
resources—what has been referred to by some as a period of 
austerity92—some agencies devote substantial portions of their 
scarce resources to accountability. There is clearly more going on 
here than mere protection of self-interest; a more nuanced 
explanation would appear to be needed.  
One such explanation is the power of ideas. As demonstrated 
by B. Guy Peters, current ideas about governance draw on several 
extremely important traditions, many of which are connected to 
accountability.93 Scholars have demonstrated that ideas can have 
strong influence on the behavior of organizations.94 In the case of 
                                                          
91 PAUL CHARLES LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS 
GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 102 (1993). 
92  Paul Pierson, From Expansion to Austerity: The New Politics of Taxing 
and Spending, in SEEKING THE CENTER: POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING AT THE 
NEW CENTURY 54, 76–77 (Martin A. Levin et al. eds., 2001); Paul Pierson, 
Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent 
Democracies, in THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE, 410, 423–25 (Paul 
Pierson ed., 2001); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a 
Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 65–67 (1997) 
[hereinafter Pierce, Judicial Review]. 
93 See B. GUY PETERS, THE FUTURE OF GOVERNING 16–22 (2001) 
(demonstrating that among the ideas that shape governance in today’s world are 
participation and market-based ideas, including ideas of transparency).  
94 See, e.g., MARK BLYTH, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS 
AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 20–27 (2002) 
(reviewing the literature on the power of ideas); JOHN D. CAMPBELL, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 17–23 (2004) (citing additional 
sources therein); John L. Campbell, Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas 
in Political Economy, in THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 159, 175–77 (John L. Campbell & Ove K. Pedersen eds., 2001); John 
L. Campbell, Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy, 
27 THEORY & SOC’Y 377 (1998); George Kateb, Ideology and Storytelling, 69 
SOC. RES. 321, 321–23 (2002) (observing that ideas are powerful enough to lead 
people to do horrible things under totalitarian regimes); Robert C. Lieberman, 
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agencies, ideas can also be translated into actual pressures and 
changes through politicians, interest groups, and the 
administrators’ epistemic community, including those that write 
about agencies.  
One set of ideas which greatly influences the behavior of 
agencies draws upon market ideology and private sector reforms.95 
An argument made by supporters of these ideas is that traditional 
hierarchical mechanisms of accountability do not work very well; 
they argue that market style mechanisms can provide better 
accountability and achieve better results.96 Whether or not, as an 
empirical matter, market-style reforms do in fact improve 
accountability—and there is doubt about that claim97—the idea 
                                                          
Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change, 96 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 697, 699–700 (2003). 
95 For example, reforms attempting to introduce ideas current in the private 
sector—such as competition, privatization, incentive-based approaches—into 
the public sector. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, 
MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990); PETERS, supra note 93, at 22–30; 
Isabel M. Bjork & Catherine R. Connors, Free Markets and Their Umpires: The 
Appeal of the U.S. Regulatory Model, 22 WORLD POL’Y J. 51, 51 (2005); David 
Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12 (2005); David Levi-Faur, Regulatory Capitalism: 
The Dynamics of Change beyond Telecoms and Electricity, 19 GOVERNANCE 
497 (2006). 
96 See BEHN, supra note 14, at 37–38; Bjork & Connors, supra note 95, at 
52–53; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1314–27 (2003); Michael Trebilcock & Edward M. 
Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1422–24. 
97 For those raising concerns about the effect of market style reforms on 
accountability, see Carol Harlow, Public Service, Market Ideology, and 
Citizenship, in PUBLIC SERVICES AND CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPEAN LAW (Mark 
Freedland & Silvana Sciarra eds., 1998), GREG PALAST ET AL., DEMOCRACY 
AND REGULATION: HOW THE PUBLIC CAN GOVERN ESSENTIAL SERVICES 20–22 
(2003) (describing British and Indian transactions in which review and comment 
or other public review processes were insufficient and thus unnecessarily 
costly), and Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for 
the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1260–63 (2003). On the other hand, 
there is also a substantial literature supporting the claim. See e.g., STEVEN K. 
VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES 17–21 (1996) (incorporating market 
forces considerations into a state institutions framework); Scott Furlong, 
Political Influences on the Bureaucracy—the Bureaucracy Speaks, 8 J. PUB. 
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exists and is powerful, and this belief in the efficacy of the market 
can easily drive public servants to try to increase their own 
accountability through methods that aim at exploiting the reputed 
advantages of the market. Agencies whose work is not easily 
privatized or which cannot really compete with the market’s 
reputed price discipline may emphasize, instead, more achievable 
benefits such as increased information and transparency.98  
Many times people appointed to lead agencies have come in 
with a strong belief in transparency.99 In the cases described in this 
Article, the appointment of Peter Hutt as Chief Counsel of the 
FDA, with his belief in transparency, directly influenced the 
reforms adopted. In that case, the politically appointed 
commissioner was also onboard. In the case of the IRS, 
Commissioner Rossotti’s belief in the need for reform and his 
continued belief in transparency also advanced the reform.  
Yet another set of important ideas that influence modern 
agencies relate to increasing public participation and the role of 
citizens in government.100 Substantial amounts of scholarship have 
promoted the idea of giving citizens more opportunities to 
participate, often suggesting new and original modes of doing 
so.101  Practical experiments in participatory government have been 
                                                          
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 39, 48–50 (1998). 
98 See COSMO GRAHAM, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH (2000), for an example of the regulatory agencies 
in England trying to increase their legitimacy through transparency. 
99 See generally WOOD & WATERMAN, supra note 18; see also Furlong, 
supra note 97, at 39. 
100 PETERS, supra note 93, at 50–64.   
101 See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS § 
II (1998); JOHN GASTIL, BY POPULAR DEMAND: REVITALIZING 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY THROUGH DELIBERATIVE ELECTIONS (2000); 
PAUL HIRST, ASSOCIATIVE DEMOCRACY: NEW FORMS OF ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL GOVERNANCE  15–43 (1994); ETHAN LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004); 
Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST. 
PLANNERS 216 (1969); Ned Crosby et al., Citizens Panels: A New Approach to 
Citizen Participation, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 170 (1986); Frank Fischer, Citizen 
Participation and the Democratization of Policy Expertise: From Theoretical 
Inquiry to Practical Cases, 26 POL’Y SCI. 165 (1993); Judith E. Innes & David 
E. Booher, Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century, 5 
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conducted.102 The effect of this may have been much greater on 
agencies than on Congress or the President. Much attention has 
been given to efforts to increase participation in agency 
proceedings.103 Just as with market ideology, a good deal of 
                                                          
PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 419 (2004); Lyn Kathlene & John A. Martin, 
Enhancing Citizen Participation: Panel Designs, Perspectives, and Policy 
Formation, 10 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 46 (1991); Jennifer Nou, 
Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal for Deliberative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 601 (2008); Ortwin Renn et al., Public Participation 
in Decision Making: A Three-Step Procedure, 26 POL’Y SCI. 189 (1993); Nancy  
Roberts, Public Deliberation in an Age of Direct Citizen Participation, 34 AM. 
REV. PUB. ADMIN. 315 (2004). 
102 See JAMES L. CREIGHTON, THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION HANDBOOK: 
MAKING BETTER DECISIONS THROUGH CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT 18–20 (2005); 
Ned Crosby, Citizens Juries: One Solution for Difficult Environmental 
Questions, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETITION IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: 
EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE 157–87 (Ortwin Renn 
et al. eds., 1995); Peter C. Deienel & Ortwin Renn, Planning Cells: A Gate to 
“Fractal” Mediation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETITION IN CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE, 
supra, at 117–40 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds., 1995); Archon Fung & Erik Olin 
Wright, Thinking About Empowered Participatory Governance, in DEEPENING 
DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY 
GOVERNANCE 4–5 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003); Gastil, supra 
note 101; Carolyn M. Hendriks, Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells: 
Lay Citizen Deliberations, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: 
STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 80–110 
(John Gastil & Peter Levine eds., 2005); Carolyn J. Lukensmeyer et al., A Town 
Meeting for the Twenty-First Century, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY, supra, at 154–63; Edward C. Weeks, The Practice of Deliberative 
Democracy: Results from Four Large-Scale Trials, 60 Pub. Admin. Rev. 360 
(2000).   
103 See, e.g., CAROLYN J. LUKENSMEYER & LARS  HASSELBLAD TORRES, 
PUBLIC DELIBERATION: A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT (2006), 
available at http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Lukens 
meyerReport.pdf; Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened 
Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972); 
Archon Fung, Varieties of Participation in Complex Government, 66 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 66 (2006); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation 
in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 361 (1972); Ogden, supra 
note 18, at 559–67; David Schlosberg et al., Democracy and E-Rulemaking: 
Web-Based Technologies, Participation, and the Potential for Deliberation, 4 J. 
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criticism has been directed towards these efforts. Quite a lot of this 
criticism has been directed at the methods, mostly in relation to 
inherent inequalities in the ability to participate and influence,104 
but there has also been discussion of the inappropriateness of 
participation to certain administrative decisions.105 Even so, the 
influence on bureaucrats has been substantial. These ideas enter the 
bureaucratic consciousness through training and scholarship, as 
well as pressure from political appointees to the agency and from 
the White House.  
In the cases discussed below in Part III, Hutt’s belief in input 
led him to raise the importance of comments by requiring the FDA 
to respond to each comment it received. The desire to increase 
input evidenced by both the EPA staff and commissioners directly 
relates to the style of reforms that were adopted there. At the IRS, 
the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel directly increased the role of private 
citizens—hopefully representative of “the public”—in decision-
making. In all three cases, the reforms aimed at increasing 
stakeholder participation.  
                                                          
INFO. TECH. & POL. 37 (2007) available at 
http://people.umass.edu/stu/doc/JITP4-1_ 
Democracy.pdf. 
104 See generally JEFFERY M. BERRY & CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST 
GROUP SOCIETY (5th ed. 2009); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, 
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 
(Harper & Row 1972); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-
Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245 (1998); Janet Newman et al., Public Participation 
and Collaborative Governance, 33 J. SOC. POL’Y 203 (2004); Thomas E. 
Engram, Liberty, Equality and Fairness: A Study of Citizen Participation in 
Federal Agency Rulemaking (April 16, 2008) (unpublised Ph.D. dissertation, 
Georgia State University), available at  http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/political_ 
science_diss/4/. 
105 Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory 
Policy?, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO 
REGUALTORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Eric W. Orts & 
Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001) [hereinafter Coglianese, Is Consensus an 
Appropriate Basis]; Reiss, Tailored Participation, supra note 20, at 345–46; Jim 
Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for 
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997). 
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C. Role Definition: Bureaucrats Expand Their Commitment to 
Mission to Include a Commitment to Accountability 
An important theme that emerges from the public 
administration literature is bureaucrats’ involvement in policy 
making106 and bureaucrats’ strong commitment to the mission of 
their particular agency.107 Challenging the rational choice view of 
the self-interested bureaucrat, a whole line of public administration 
studies have suggested that many of those going into the public 
service do so because they are motivated to participate in the 
making of policy and in achieving policy goals, creating a better 
world.108 The most recent line of public administration studies 
addressing this, starting in the 1990s, coined the term “Public 
Service Motivation.”109 This line of literature used empirical 
                                                          
106 ABERBACH & ROCKMAN, supra note 58, at 8. 
107 See ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 26–84 (Waveland Press 
1994) (1966); KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING 
POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 347–48 (1997); J. 
Jonathan Bender et al., Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy 
Design, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 873 (1987); Gene Brewer et al., Individual 
Conceptions of Public Service Motivation, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 254, 255 
(2000) [hereinafter Brewer et al., Individual Conceptions]; James L. Perry, 
Antecedents of Public Service Motivation, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 181 
(1997); James L. Perry, Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of 
Construct Reliability and Validity, 6 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 5–6 
(1996) [hereinafter Perry, Measuring Public Service Motivation]; Bradley E. 
Wright, Public-Sector Work Motivation: A Review of the Current Literature and 
a Revised Conceptual Model, 11 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 559 (2001). 
Not all civil servants are devoted to the mission, even under theories that 
acknowledge that some are, see DOWNS, supra, at 83, and such devotion does not 
always have positive consequences, for example strong bureaucratic loyalty to 
one mission may motivate administrators to resist certain changes and tasks. See 
Brewer et al, Individual Conceptions, supra note 107, at 261. 
108 See JANET V. DENHARDT & ROBERT B. DENHARDT, THE NEW PUBLIC 
SERVICE: SERVING, NOT STEERING 3–4 (expanded ed. 2007); John DiIulio, 
Principled Agents: The Cultural Bases of Behavior in a Federal Government 
Bureaucracy, 4 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 277, 281–82 (1994).  
109  See Gene A. Brewer & Sally Coleman Selden, Whistle Blowers in the 
Federal Civil Service: New Evidence of the Public Service Ethic, 8 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 413, 415–19 (1998); Donald P. Moynihan & Sanjay K. 
Pandey, The Role of Organizations in Fostering Public Service Motivation, 67 
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survey data in an attempt to compare the attitudes and motives of 
public servants to those of business executives. It consistently 
showed that high level civil servants were more likely to be 
motivated by the mission and the public interest than were their 
private sector counterparts.110 Not only that, but the studies provide 
evidence that suggests that public servants are more motivated by 
intrinsic job satisfaction and the opportunity to provide service and 
less motivated by financial rewards than their private sector 
counterparts;111 that they are more strongly motivated when they 
feel their mission is important;112 and their devotion to the public 
interest is not limited to their jobs, as they also volunteer more 
outside their professional life in terms of both money and time.113 
Needless to say, this is a general description and does not describe 
all civil servants; at least one study classified public servants 
according to their motivation and found some variety.114 But the 
trend is clear, and perhaps not surprising—after all, in the United 
States, high level public servants usually have a graduate degree,115 
                                                          
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 40, 41 (2007); James L. Perry & Lois Recascino Wise, The 
Motivational Bases of Public Service, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 367, 368 (1990).  
110 See Brewer & Selden, supra note 109, at 429–33; Philip E. Crewson, 
Public-service Motivation: Building Empirical Evidence of Incidence and Effect, 
7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY, 499, 500, 512 (1997); Perry, Measuring 
Public Service Motivation, supra note 107, at 6–9, 20–21; Perry & Wise, supra 
note 109, at 369-70. One limitation of this literature is that it focuses almost 
completely on the upper levels of the civil service, i.e. people in management 
positions, and therefore will not tell you much about the motivation of your mail 
carrier or customs official; however, the kind of accountability mechanisms 
discussed here are usually created at the policy-making level, as the case studies 
demonstrate. Thus, the high-level population that this literature describes is 
exactly the right one to study for the purposes of the present Article.  
111 See Crewson, supra note 110, at 504; Bradley E. Wright, Public Service 
and Motivation: Does Mission Matter?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 54, 54 (2007) 
[hereinafter Wright, Public Service and Motivation]. 
112 See Wright, Public Service and Motivation, supra note 111, at 60. 
113 See David J. Houston, ‘‘Walking the Walk’’ of Public Service 
Motivation: Public Employees and Charitable Gifts of Time, Blood, and Money, 
16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 67, 73 (2005).  
114 See Brewer et al., Individual Conceptions, supra note 107, at 255. 
115 B. GUY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 93–94 (Routledge 5th ed. 2001)(1978). Though less of them come 
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but compared to private sector employees they are paid less116 and 
certainly enjoy less prestige than managers in private businesses117 
or equivalent level civil servants in other countries.118 They face 
jobs that are typically very challenging and have relatively less 
power than elected officials. Why would anyone take on such work 
unless he/she cared deeply about it and the interests it serves?  
In today’s world, where accountability is such a strong word, it 
is no wonder that certain civil servants accept commitment to 
accountability as part of their mission, as the case studies in Part 
III reflect. Agencies believe they should be accountable, not just 
because they buy into ideas of transparency and participation, but 
because it’s part of their role definition: as they view it, one aspect 
of doing a good job is to be accountable.119 Accordingly, they are 
willing to make efforts and act in ways that will promote 
accountability. Furthermore, at least one study demonstrated that 
reforms in the public sector could increase the level of public 
service motivation, including reforms aimed at increasing 
accountability.120  
                                                          
from Ivy League institutions. Id. at 116–17. The Fact Book of the Federal Office 
of Personnel Management for 2007 found that since 2000 over sixty percent had 
graduate degrees and less than ten percent were not college graduates. U.S. 
OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE STATISTICS: THE 
FACT BOOK 73 (2007 ed.), available at http://www.opm.gov/feddata/ 
factbook/2007/2007FACTBOOK.pdf. See also Gregory B. Lewis & Sue A. 
Frank, Who Wants to Work for the Government?, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 395, 400 
(2002) (“[B]etter educated Americans were more likely than others to work for 
the government.”).   
116 HAL G. RAINEY, UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING PUBLIC 
ORGANIZATIONS 239 (3d ed. 2003); Laura I. Langbein & Gregory B. Lewis, 
Pay, Productivity, and the Public Sector: The Case of Electrical Engineers, 8 J. 
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 391, 391–92, 409 (1998). 
117 RAINEY, supra note 116, at 327; B. Guy Peters, Searching for a Role: 
The Civil Service in American Democracy, 14 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 373, 383 
(1993). 
118 Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, What Has Happened to the U.S. 
Senior Civil Service?, 8 BROOKINGS REV. 35, 35 (1990).  
119 James H. Svara, The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of 
Politics and Administration in the Past and Future of Public Administration, 61 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 176, 179 (2001). 
120 See generally Moynihan & Pandey, supra note 109. 
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In other words, civil servants—bureaucrats—are strongly 
motivated to serve the public interest; they will begin to actively 
seek increases in transparency and/or responsiveness if and when 
they perceive that the public interest calls for that kind of reform. 
In a reality that emphasizes accountability, we can expect civil 
servants to internalize the idea that accountability is an integral 
part of their mission, one that is completely necessary if their job is 
to be done well.  
Some support for the idea that bureaucrats internalize the need 
for increased transparency and responsiveness comes from a recent 
survey of bureaucrats’ attitudes to e-rulemaking conducted by 
Jeffrey Lubbers, a renowned expert on rulemaking. Aside from his 
empirical findings, Lubbers reports on the comments made about 
e-rulemaking, many of which were positive. Among the positive 
aspects bureaucrats emphasized were the improvement rulemaking 
creates in the ability of the public to participate and the 
transparency of the process.121 Here are some examples from his 
responses:  
 
E-rulemaking is the obvious choice for encouraging public 
comment and allowing easy access to records from 
anywhere and without risking the loss of original hard 
copies. 
 
With more people using the Internet, it seems the right way 
to conduct rulemaking and promises to reach more folks 
who don’t read the Federal Register.   
 
In addition to reaching older members of society, making 
the process available online makes it more likely we will 
reach members of Generation X and the Millennium 
Generation . . . . 
 
E-rulemaking is better at letting the public know what the 
agencies are doing than it is at providing thoughtful input 
                                                          
121 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Survey of Federal Agency Rulemakers’ 
Attitudes About E-Rulemaking, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 451, 471 (2010). 
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into the decisions themselves.  
 
[M]aking agency rulemaking more accessible to the 
public . . .  
 
Makes it much easier for the public to see the 
comments . . . .122 
 
There were, of course, also negative comments,123 but the 
reason given for the positive comments—the increase of access—
supports the claim that many bureaucrats had internalized the need 
for public access and accountability.  
The level of resources and efforts devoted to accountability 
that I have described in the case studies below may or may not 
truly indicate an internalization of a desire for accountability by 
agency staffs. However, officials of the agencies repeatedly 
express the view that the observed actions demonstrate exactly 
that. Hutt strongly emphasized how the FDA officials internalized 
the need for transparency, to a degree where he felt obliged to say 
“stop,” refusing the publication of trade secrets related to new drug 
applications because of the negative policy consequences that 
would have resulted. In speaking to the IRS’s officials, they too 
say many of the staff, especially at the higher levels, internalized 
the need to increase transparency.124 In neither case did I conduct a 
thorough investigation of the staff to see whether they have, 
indeed, internalized the norms; but that is the impression of 
important, well informed observers and it is supported by the 
efforts devoted to increasing accountability.  
III. CASE STUDIES OF AGENCIES SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY  
Through several case studies, this section develops an 
argument that agencies seek out ways to be accountable. Showing 
                                                          
122 Id. at 471–72. 
123 See id. at 472–74. 
124 Telephone Interview with IRS Official (under promise of 
confidentiality) (June 24, 2009). 
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that agencies are willing to add accountability mechanisms is not 
hard. Examples are legion. To use a major one, the APA exempts 
matters “relating to agency management or personnel or to public 
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts” from rulemaking 
procedures.125 On its face, this would mean agencies providing 
government benefits are not required to go through notice and 
comment. However, again and again, government agencies 
dispersing benefits adopted the notice and comment requirements 
in their own regulations, without any legal obligation—even 
though such adoption subjects them to possible criticism and 
facilitates judicial review.126 The Department of Labor adopted 
notice and comment procedures when implementing the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, saying:  
It is the policy of the Secretary of Labor, that in applying 
the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure 
Act (5 U.S.C. 553), the exemption therein for matters 
relating to public property, loans, grants, benefits or 
contracts shall not be relied upon as a reason for not 
complying with the notice and public participation 
requirements thereof . . . .127  
Other examples cited by Lubbers in his book on rulemaking 
include the Department of Transportation, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of 
Agriculture, and the Small Business Administration.128 As Part 
III.A documents, a self-initiated elaboration and deepening of the 
elements of notice and comment was a substantial part of the 
reform of the FDA procedures in the 1970s. Courts treat deviations 
from these regulations as if they were violations of the notice and 
comment procedures in the APA;129 accordingly, an agency 
                                                          
125 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(a)(2) (West 2010). 
126 JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 62 
(4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter LUBBERS, A GUIDE]. 
127 29 C.F.R. § 2.7 (1979). 
128 See LUBBERS, A GUIDE, supra note 126, at 63 n.60. 
129 See, e.g., Rodway v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 
1975); see also LUBBERS, A GUIDE, supra note 128, at 63 n.61. 
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adopting them is at risk of having its work overturned on 
procedural grounds or because of not responding to comments—
incurring an increased risk of sanctions.  
In another example, before engaging in the rulemaking that 
was the subject of the famous Vermont Yankee case,130 the Atomic 
Energy Commission (as it was then called) voluntarily adopted 
adversarial proceedings, including cross-examinations, even 
though those added to the length of proceedings.131  
Taking this further, Elizabeth Magill demonstrated that 
agencies often engage in self-regulation, regulation limiting their 
discretion, providing many examples.132  
A few of these were: 
[T]he Social Security Administration’s “grid” regulations, 
which succeeded in turning the question of whether a party 
is disabled into a series of (more) objective questions.133 
[T]he Food and Drug Administration’s decision to provide 
notice and invite comment on its “guidance documents” 
even though the APA would not have required it.134 
In the following case studies, I track in more detail some 
examples of increased accountability, focusing on three agencies, 
in chronological order of the efforts described. The FDA reformed 
its procedures to increase transparency and participation in the 
1970s, and provides an early case study of such behavior. Since at 
least the 1980s, the EPA has been experimenting with new ideas to 
increase its accountability. Finally, the IRS, widely held up for 
years as an example of complete non-accountability,135 has been 
working for over ten years on increasing its transparency and 
                                                          
130 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 
519 (1978). 
131 Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee, in ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW STORIES 124, 134–35 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).  
132 Magill, supra note 59, at 866–69.  
133 Id. at 867.  
134 Id. at 868.  
135 Wm. Brian Henning, Reforming the IRS: The Effectiveness of the 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 82 MARQ. L. 
REV. 405, 405–06, 427 (1999); Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal 
Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 769 (2001). 
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responsiveness to the general public.  
The history of these agencies shows the persistent phenomenon 
of agencies seeking to increase their accountability, covering as it 
does a span of time that begins in the 1970s (for the FDA cases) 
and continues through the 1980s (with the EPA’s efforts) up to the 
present (with the FDA and the EPA’s later efforts and the IRS’s 
actions). When considering the significance of the following three 
case studies, we should note that the subjects of the studies are all 
large and important agencies. The IRS is a mammoth agency with 
over 100,000 employees spread throughout the country, and its 
actions affect the lives of almost every citizen and resident. The 
FDA and the EPA likewise work in areas that directly affect the 
quality of life of most citizens of the United States, regulating, 
between them, food, air quality, water quality, medicine, and other 
areas. These are bodies whose actions have great effect upon 
United States public policy. 
A. The Efforts of the FDA to Increase its Accountability 
In the 1960s and 1970s dramatic procedural changes were 
imposed on agencies. In 1966 Congress adopted the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) requiring that governmental information 
be made public unless it fit into one of the exceptions in the Act.136 
In the 1970s, the D.C. Circuit required that agencies respond to the 
major issues raised in comments137 and emphasized that the basis 
of a decision must be clearly explained.138 But even as the D.C. 
                                                          
136 Today it is codified as 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
137 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 
F.2d 633, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1976): 
An agency need not respond to frivolous or repetitive comment it 
receives. However, where apparently significant information has been 
brought to its attention, or substantial issues of policy or gaps in its 
reasoning raised, the statement of basis and purpose must indicate why 
the agency decided the criticisms were invalid. 
See also Portland Cement Ass’n v. Rucklehause, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
138 See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 462 F.2d 846, 849–
50 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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Circuit started its quest to control rulemaking,139 certain agencies 
started adopting similar requirements on their own, increasing their 
accountability voluntarily. This section describes one such story, 
that of the FDA, and examines two sets of efforts: the FDA’s work 
to increase its transparency by internalizing the values in the 
FOIA140 and the FDA’s procedural reform, both of which occurred 
during the same time period (early to mid 1970s) and reflected the 
same spirit of increasing transparency and participation.  
1. Efforts to Increase Implementation of FOIA 
Criticisms of the weakness of FOIA implementation were 
common in the early 1970s for agencies generally, and the FDA 
was no exception; several specific criticisms of it were made.141 
Historically, the FDA, like other agencies, produced minimal 
compliance, releasing information only sparsely and reluctantly. 
This was a defense mechanism against criticism: “[I]f the public 
doesn’t get information, they have a difficult time objecting to 
what FDA does.”142 That changed in 1972.  
When Peter Barton Hutt was appointed as Chief Counsel for 
the FDA in 1971, the importance of improving the agency’s 
transparency was impressed on him both by his predecessor, 
William H. Goodrich, and by the then Commissioner, Charles C. 
Edwards. The mandate fit in with Hutt’s own philosophy. Hutt 
                                                          
139 See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law 
and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1155–66 
(2001) (citing examples). 
140 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2010). 
141  See Jeremy R. T. Lewis, FOIA and the Emergence of Federal 
Information Policy in the 1980s and 1990s, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 41, 42 (G. David Garson ed., 2000); Ralph Nader, New 
Opportunities for Open Government: The 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of  
Information Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 
3–4 (1975); Kenneth D. Salomon & Lawrence H. Wechsler, Freedom of 
Information Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150, 155–56, 159–
60, 163 (1969–1970); Ralph Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the 
Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (1970). 
142 Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, formerly Chief Counsel, 
FDA, currently Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP (June 20, 2009). 
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viewed transparency as an important accountability mechanism, 
one that should be put in place: 
My personal philosophy is that full disclosure to the public 
is the essence of democracy. . . . if the public doesn’t 
understand what’s going on in government, government 
can hide all forms of mischief and injustice. Whereas if 
everything is made public government has someone 
looking over their shoulder—sunlight kills a lot of 
issues.143 
His first weeks on the job were devoted to determining how the 
FDA should comply with FOIA in a way that would increase its 
transparency.144 He used his substantial discretion in implementing 
the mandate he received to create a solid framework, categorizing 
each document and creating a set of rules regarding its disclosure. 
He met every Friday with a team consisting of the FDA 
Commissioner and other senior officials in the FDA, keeping them 
informed and on board, and providing them a chance for input into 
the process. While the work was Hutt’s, the policy was endorsed 
and supported by the agency’s heads, all of whom at least 
accepted, if not actually endorsed, the need for increased 
transparency. Richard Merrill, Hutt’s successor as Chief Counsel, 
explained that, “Hutt did the major job of convincing the main 
people in the agency—the ones I refer to as our client—people 
responsible for substantive programs.”145 
The result was a proposed rule published in the Federal 
Register on May 5, 1972.146 The rule spread over ten of the 
Register’s small-print, three-column pages, and included 
substantial details. In the preamble to the rule, the Commissioner, 
signing the proposed rule, expressed his commitment to FOIA’s 
basic premise that “public disclosure should be the rule rather than 
the exception.”147  
                                                          
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Telephone Interview with Richard A. Merrill, formerly Chief Counsel, 
FDA, currently Professor of Law, Emeritus, Virginia Law School (July 7, 2009). 
146 Public Information, 37 Fed. Reg. 9128 (May 5, 1972).   
147 Id. 
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That does not mean every piece of information the agency had 
was disclosed. The most notable exception was in relation to New 
Drug Applications (“NDAs”), and information containing trade 
secrets submitted with them. When submitting an application to 
license a new drug, a company has to submit substantial amounts 
of information to demonstrate the drug’s safety and efficacy,148 
much of which it would not want its competitors to know. Trade 
secret confidentiality is preserved under at least three legal 
sources: Section 552(b)(4) of FOIA (permitting confidentiality),149 
the Trade Secrets Act (prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets by 
federal officials),150 and section 331(j) of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (prohibiting the revealing of trade secrets to anyone 
outside the department other than the courts or Congress).151 Hutt 
decided that the strong prohibitions on disclosing trade secrets, as 
well as longstanding agency precedent, supported a restrictive 
approach to disclosing materials attached to NDAs, under which 
the supporting materials would remain confidential.152 However, to 
                                                          
148 James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and 
Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 71, 75–76 (1998). 
149 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(4) (West 2010) 
(“This section does not apply to matters that are . . . trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.”). 
150 Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1905 (West 2010): 
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any 
department or agency thereof, . . . publishes, divulges, discloses, or 
makes known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any 
information coming to him in the course of his employment or official 
duties . . . which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets . . . 
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than one year, or 
both; and shall be removed from office or employment. 
151 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(j) (West 2010): 
The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited; . . . 
revealing, other than to the Secretary or officers or employees of the 
Department, or to the courts when relevant in any judicial proceeding 
under this chapter, any information acquired . . . concerning any 
method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection . . . . 
152 Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142. 
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preserve the public’s right to know and in the interest of 
transparency, the agency published summaries of the reasoning 
and materials behind a decision—a Summary of Basis of Approval 
(“SBA”).153 This decision was arrived at through a consultation 
between Hutt and Richard Crout, head of the Bureau of Drugs, in 
which Crout agreed that the SBA was a reasonable compromise 
between protecting trade secrets and assuring transparency. It was 
criticized by industry members who saw the SBA as disclosing too 
much information154 and by consumer interest groups for not 
providing enough information.155 But it was clearly an effort by the 
agency to go beyond its previous practices and increase its 
transparency beyond what was mandated under FOIA, as the 
agency interpreted it.  
It took over two years to finalize the FDA’s public information 
rule (which is not unusual—a recent study found that the average 
time for rules from notice to final rule is 2.2 years156), and during 
that time the agency received 667 letters, including 68 substantive 
comments to the rule (which the final regulation answered in 
                                                          
153 Id.; Robert M. Halperin, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Effectiveness 
Data: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 1979 DUKE L.J. 286, 287 n.9 (1979).  
154 Halperin, supra note 153, at 287; James T. O’Reilly, Implications of 
International Drug Approval Systems on Confidentiality of Business Secrets in 
the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 123, 128–31 (1998). 
155 Judith Axler Turner, Consumer, Report/FDA Pursues Historic Role 
Amid Public, Industry Pressures, 1975 NAT’L J. REPS 250, Feb. 15, 1975, at 
250, 254 (on file with author). For a more recent example of the same criticism, 
a known consumer rights advocate on health matters, Dr. Sidney Wolfe, a 
member of the consumer watchdog group Public Citizen, said in response to the 
FDA’s creation of a task force to increase transparency in 2009:  
For something like 36 years, through litigation and every other means, 
we have been trying to expand access to data on drug safety and 
efficacy . . . To make access to clinical trial data [happen] much sooner 
is a great idea for the public, for everyone that’s involved. . . . It’s anti-
scientific and anti-intellectual to have these important data secret.  
Steven Reinberg, FDA to Study Ways to Be More Open with Public, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK (June 2, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.business 
week.com/lifestyle/content/healthday/627708.html; see also Halperin, supra 
note 153, at 287. 
156 West, supra note 14, at 69. 
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detail).157 However, the change in policy was implemented 
immediately, without waiting for the regulations to be finalized, 
although it was changed somewhat as a result of the comments 
received.158  
The regulations that the FDA promulgated between 1972 and 
1974 had a dramatic impact on the FDA’s FOIA practice: before 
the regulations, the FDA granted only about 10 percent of FOIA 
requests submitted to it; after them, it granted about 98 percent.159 
The agency seemed to have internalized and bought into the new 
and expansive approach to transparency. In fact, Hutt describes 
how agency staff wanted to go further than he thought appropriate 
on certain issues: 
[Agency staff] . . . feel conflicted on safety and 
effectiveness data. They get so much criticism for not 
releasing it from people who don’t understand that that’s 
confidential trade secret, and they want to just release it—
and get rid of the criticism. But you have to understand the 
consequences—releasing all trade secrets will destroy the 
American pharmaceutical industry. 160 
The goal of this increased transparency, as stated by Peter Hutt, 
was to increase public scrutiny of the FDA’s actions with a view to 
allowing the public to prevent abuses. Critics continued to 
challenge the FDA on grounds that it still has not done enough;161 
but the agency, in this case, acted with the goal of increasing 
accountability. Nor was this the last time the FDA acted to increase 
its transparency, though the later examples are beyond the scope of 
this project.162 
                                                          
157 Public Information, 39 Fed. Reg. 44602 (December 24, 1974). 
158 Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142. 
159 Halperin, supra note 153, at 286. 
160 Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142. 
161 E.g., Louis P. Garrison, Jr. et al., Assessing A Structured, Quantitative 
Health Outcomes Approach To Drug Risk-Benefit Analysis, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
684, 685 (2007). 
162 More recently, the agency created a task force dedicated to increasing its 
transparency and a “transparency blog” dedicated to following the agency’s 
efforts to increase its transparency and allowing the public to comment. See 
About This Blog, FDA TRANSPARENCY BLOG (Nov. 10, 2008), http://fda 
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2. Procedural Reform 
Today’s administrative law is marked by complex procedures 
and substantial demands on agencies.  To avoid having their 
decisions labeled “arbitrary and capricious,”163 agencies must 
explain their actions in the “concise general statement” demanded 
by the APA164 and must respond to the comments they received.165 
In fact, in today’s world, the multitude of requirements for 
explanations by agencies are criticized more often than not.166 But 
there was a time when the requirement of explaining an agency’s 
action was new and exciting. So when the FDA adopted a set of 
procedural regulations that required extensive information to be 
provided in a rule’s preamble, it was ahead of its time in imposing 
these requirements on itself to increase its accountability.  
The background to the procedural reform was a period of 
divided government, with President Richard Nixon in the White 
House until 1974, followed by Gerald Ford, both Republicans 
facing a Democratic Congress.167 The democrats in Congress were 
wary of the FDA, and kept a close eye on it, repeatedly criticizing 
                                                          
transparencyblog.fda.gov/about-this-blog.html.   
163 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (West 2010). 
164 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(c) (West 2010).   
165 MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL 
OF ADMINISTRATION 47–48 (1988); Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine 
Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 263 
(1986); R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 
ADMIN. L. REV. 245, 246–47 (1992). 
166 SHAPIRO, supra note 165, at 47–48; Melnick, supra note 165, at 246–47; 
Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, supra note 55, at 68–69. 
167 In 1971–1973, the House of Representatives members were split 
between 255 Democrats and 180 Republicans and the Senate had 54 Democrats 
and 44 Republicans (and one conservative and one independent); in 1973–1975 
there were 242 Democrats and 192 Republicans in the House, and 56 Democrats 
and 42 Republicans in the Senate (and one conservative and one independent).  
House History, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 
2011) (giving House membership); Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, 
U.S. SENATE, http://senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/party 
div.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2011) (giving Senate membership). 
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its actions and demanding explanations from officials.168 In an 
effort to increase the agency’s legitimacy and reduce Congress’ 
concerns, Hutt undertook to reform the agency’s procedures,169 
implementing what were innovations at the time, though these 
rules would later become a staple of administrative law.  
The change was perhaps most extreme in relation to 
rulemaking. Like many other agencies, the FDA initially used 
adjudications as its main mode of decision-making. However, as 
the agency’s authority was expanded by Congress, mounting 
pressures of workload made this inefficient, and the agency 
increased its use of rulemaking in the early 1960s.170 One of Hutt’s 
major projects was to guide the implementation of the change to an 
agency that works primarily through rulemaking.171 This change fit 
with the general trend towards increased rulemaking in the 1960s–
1970s,172 fueled in part by concerns about the administrative state’s 
accountability—rulemaking was seen as more “sleek, efficient and 
fair” compared to the slowness, uncertainty, and potential 
arbitrariness inherent to agency adjudication.173 
However, rulemaking as the FDA implemented it did not look 
like rulemaking as today’s administrative scholars describe it.174 
Instead, rulemaking included a short notice including the proposed 
regulation (and the other minimal information required by the 
APA),175 and after the comments had been submitted, the agency 
would publish the final rule with a statement that “having 
considered the comments, I [i.e., the commissioner] hereby 
                                                          
168 Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142.  
169 Id. 
170 See Schiller, supra note 139, at 1148–49.  
171 Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142.  
172 See Schiller, supra note 139, at 1145–52. 
173 Id. at 1140–41; see also Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, supra note 55, at 59 (elaborating on the benefits of agency 
rulemaking).  
174 Though it probably looked more like the process anticipated and 
designed by the drafters of the APA. See Schiller, supra note 139, at 1159.  
175 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b) (West 2010) 
(requiring time, place and nature of public rulemaking proceedings, if any, 
reference to legal authority for the rule, either terms of rule or description of 
subjects and issues involved).  
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promulgate the final regulation.”176 
Under the same rationale of increasing transparency to increase 
agency accountability and reduce abuses, Hutt implemented two 
related innovations. First, he required the agency to have a detailed 
preamble both in the proposed rule177 and in the final rule.178 The 
preamble would have to include: 
[A] summary first paragraph describing the substance of 
the document in easily understandable terms, . . . (vii) 
supplementary information about the regulation in the body 
of the preamble that contains references to prior notices 
relating to the same matter and a summary of each type of 
comment submitted on the proposal and the 
Commissioner’s conclusions with respect to each. The 
preamble is to contain a thorough and comprehensible 
explanation of the reasons for the Commissioner’s decision 
on each issue.179 
In short, it called for a great deal of information to be produced 
by the agency.  
The reform was not universally welcomed by agency staff: 
“People at FDA were at first blush horrified,” but Hutt was not 
deterred. “[This] was a form of transparency. We told the 
American public, ‘this is why we are doing it.’”180 The courts’ first 
steps into requiring explanation, occurring at the time, assisted 
Hutt, and his successor Merrill, to convince the agency that the 
steps were necessary.181 
In addition, the preamble was to include the commissioner’s 
response to the comments submitted, as described in the regulation 
above, preempting the demands the courts would later apply to the 
FDA. That is not to say that the agency always responded to 
comments to the satisfaction of commentators and/or the courts. In 
                                                          
176 Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142.  
177 21 C.F.R. § 10.40(b)(vii).  
178 Id. § 10.40(c)(3). 
179 Id.  
180 Telephone Interview with Peter Barton Hutt, supra note 142. 
181 Telephone Interview with Richard A. Merrill, supra note 145. 
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the Nova Scotia case, for example,182 the court criticized the 
FDA’s commissioner for not responding to certain issues raised 
directly by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Department 
of the Interior.183 But the agency took steps to increase its 
accountability, even though that added substantial work and at the 
same time increased the risk that its actions would be challenged.  
B. The EPA Works at Being Accountable 
Like the FDA, the EPA engaged in many efforts to increase its 
accountability. And just as with the FDA, this Article will focus on 
only a small sample of these behaviors. The laws governing the 
EPA were designed to promote accountability through the “fire 
alarm” approach discussed by the trio of scholars collectively 
known as “McNollgast.” When using a fire alarm approach 
Congress creates accountability mechanisms that allow private 
citizens to take action to challenge or block agency deviation from 
Congressional mandates, rather than having only “top-down” 
oversight.184 Many of the statutes delegating power to the EPA 
include provisions for citizen lawsuits.185 One source estimated 
that in the 1980s, about 80 percent of the EPA’s rules were subject 
to litigation, and described the  EPA as “embattled and embroiled 
in litigation, threats of litigation and expressions of general 
dissatisfaction on the part of all of its outside constituencies—
industry, environmentalists, and state government.”186  
In an effort to reduce the dissatisfaction with its programs and 
                                                          
182 See generally United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 
F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
183 Id. at 248. 
184 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 173–76 
(1984). 
185 For example, the Clean Water Act provision allowing anyone who is or 
might be affected by violation of the act’s provision to sue a violator. See Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 2010). The Clean Air Act has a similar 
citizen suit provision. See Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West 2010). 
186 Deborah S. Dalton, Negotiated Rulemaking Changes EPA Culture, in 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION DESKBOOK 135, 146 
(Marshall J. Breger et al. eds., 2001).  
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to increase its legitimacy, the EPA has engaged in many efforts to 
increase its accountability by increasing its transparency and the 
opportunities for public participation, sometimes through its own 
initiatives and sometimes following political prodding. Since at 
least the 1980s, the EPA has made substantial efforts to engage the 
public in dialogue and increase the input of stakeholders. It 
expresses commitment to accountability in the reports describing 
its performance and measuring goal achievements. For example, 
the agency says in its 2008 “Performance and Accountability 
Report”187 that the report “demonstrates EPA’s commitment to be 
held accountable for results.”188 In its “Framework for 
Implementing EPA’s Public Involvement Program,”189 the EPA 
explained that its goal is “to have excellent public involvement 
become an integral part of EPA’s culture, thus improving all of the 
Agency’s decision making.”190  
Many examples can be provided, but this Article will describe 
just three in chronological order: adoption of negotiated 
rulemaking, the development of the IRIS system, and the 2001 
online dialogue.  
1. Negotiated Rulemaking 
Starting in 1983 the EPA voluntarily conducted a pilot program 
of negotiated rulemaking procedures following a recommendation 
by the Administrative Conference of the United States; it was one 
of the first agencies to do so.191 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act192 
                                                          
187 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/archive.html.   
188 Id. at 2. 
189 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING EPA’S 
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT POLICY (May 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
publicinvolvement/policy2003/framework.pdf. 
190 Id. at 1.  
191  Siobhan Mee, Negotiated Rulemaking and Combined Sewer Overflows 
(CSOs): Consensus Saves Ossification?, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213, 232 
(1997) (suggesting EPA was the first). But see Cary Coglianese, Assessing 
Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE 
L.J. 1255, 1263 (1997) [hereinafter Coglianese, Assessing Consensus] 
(demonstrating the FAA was the first, with the EPA and a few other agencies 
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was only enacted in 1990, at least partly drawing on the EPA’s 
experience.193 The EPA chose negotiated rulemaking in an effort to 
reduce the adversarial nature of the regular rulemaking process and 
especially the litigation that accompanies it, but the choice also 
reflects the increasing acceptance of negotiation as a form of 
decision making in the environmental context.194 
Two initial negotiations on nonconformance penalties under 
the Clean Air Act and the criteria for emergency pesticide handling 
successfully ended in a consensus that was used in issuing the 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.195 Participants expressed 
satisfaction with the process.196 This initial success spurred the 
agency to engage in further negotiated rulemaking.  
The EPA engaged in a very systematic effort, creating a project 
staff that was devoted to identifying appropriate rules for 
negotiated rulemaking, monitoring and evaluating facilitators, and 
generally improving the process.197 Since 1990, the project’s role 
was redefined to include general conflict resolution mechanisms.198  
By 2000, the EPA had conducted twenty-one negotiated 
rulemakings, more than other agencies, on a wide range of 
topics.199 It engaged in many more evaluations to see whether 
certain rulemakings were appropriate for negotiated rulemaking.200 
While the evaluation of negotiated rulemaking is mixed,201 the 
                                                          
shortly following).  
192 Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 561 (West 2010). 
193 Mee, supra note 191, at 216.  
194 Daniel J. Fiorino & Chris Kirtz, Breaking Down Walls: Negotiated 
Rulemaking at EPA, 4 TEMP.  ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 29, 29 (1985). 
195 Id.  
196 Id. at 30. 
197 Dalton, supra note 186, at 135, 146–49. 
198 Id. at 151–52.  
199 Id. at 135. For some descriptions, see id. at 135–46.  
200 Id. at 151. 
201 Compare Dalton, supra note 186, at 149; Philip J. Harter, Assessing the 
Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 32, 33 (2000) [hereinafter Harter, Assessing the Assessors]; Philip J. Harter, 
Fear of Commitment: An Affliction of Adolescents, 46 DUKE L.J. 1389, 1421–22, 
1422 n.117 (1997); Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and 
Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 
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EPA made a clear effort to engage stakeholders in its decision 
making.  
2. The Integrated Risk Information System Database 
The EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System database 
(IRIS) is, as described at the beginning of this paper, a database 
including assessment of the risks involved with various chemicals. 
IRIS was adopted by the EPA in 1985, but the major efforts at 
reforming its procedures started in the mid 1990s.202   
After a 1997 review process, the EPA introduced several 
changes which included, for example, creating a hotline for users, 
publishing an annual agenda specific to IRIS assessments in the 
Federal Register, publishing external peer review drafts of IRIS 
assessments on its website and considering public comments on 
the drafts.203 In 2004 the agency also added, at the request of the 
Office of Management and Budget in the White House (“OMB”), a 
process that allows OMB and other federal agencies to review and 
comment on assessments; OMB involvement increased over the 
years.204 Adding the OMB process was controversial and critics 
attacked it on several grounds. It was seen as adding a political 
element to what should be a professional endeavor.205 It was seen 
as an effort by the Bush administration to add delays to the 
assessment process, as part of a pro-business agenda, since the 
assessment process is a first step in regulating a given chemical. 
However, allowing the OMB to review the EPA documents 
                                                          
113, 122–24 (1992) (giving positive evaluations), with Coglianese, Assessing 
Consensus, supra note 191, at 1309–10 (asserting that negotiated rulemaking is 
not shorter and has no less litigation than regular rulemaking); id. at 1281–1304 
(analyzing the data). See also Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of 
Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 
405–27 (2000-2001) (offering a much more pessimistic assessment) [hereinafter 
Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy]. 
202 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 2, at 6–10. 
203 Id. (taken almost, though not completely, verbatim from the report).  
204 Id. at 12, 22–23. 
205 E.g., OMB WATCH, OMB INTERFERES IN IRIS ASSESSMENTS OF TOXIC 
CHEMICALS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (May 2008), http://ombwatch.org/ 
files/regs/PDFs/IRISfactsheet.pdf. 
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increases accountability in two ways: it provides another layer of 
inter-executive branch review, that is, another layer of bureaucratic 
accountability, and since OMB is subject to presidential control, 
this procedure tends to strengthen the President’s control over 
other agencies. Since the President is the only official in the 
executive branch directly elected, strengthening his control over 
the administrative state strengthens political control over the 
professional civil service, thus strengthening at least one type of 
accountability.   
By 2007, the IRIS assessment process involved the following 
stages:206 
 
1. Before assessing a substance, the EPA would ask the public 
and other federal agencies or interested parties for 
nominations. 
2. The EPA would list which of the nominated substances 
would be assessed, and publish that list in their annual 
agenda, at the same time soliciting scientific information 
about the listed substances, both from the public and other 
federal agencies.  
3. The EPA would also do its own literature search and create a 
literature review.  
4. The EPA would do a quantitative toxological review.   
5. OMB would review the toxological report and distribute it to 
other agencies for comment. According to the General 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) report, “OMB informs 
EPA when EPA has adequately addressed interagency 
comments.”207 
6. The EPA would publish the results of the toxicological 
review and convene a public meeting of external peer 
reviewers.  
                                                          
206 This description is based on a combination of the GAO report 08-440, 
see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 13, and a descriptive 
article from the non profit OMB Watch that makes a clear distinction between 
the process as it was before the 2008 reform described below and the post-2008 
process. See White House Gains Influence in Toxic Chemical Assessments, OMB 
WATCH (April 15, 2008), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3642. 
207 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 13. 
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7. After external review, the EPA would revise the assessment 
as necessary. 
8. A second OMB review would then be conducted, with OMB 
again disseminating the information to other agencies.  
9. Finally, the EPA would post the assessment on its website. 
 
In 2008 this process was strongly criticized by the GAO as too 
long and inefficient, but it certainly has substantial accountability 
built in, most of which was voluntarily taken on by the agency 
(though adding the OMB review seemed to be due to political 
pressure).208 
On April 10, 2008, the EPA changed its process, adding 
several steps. The new steps substantially increased OMB’s role in 
the process as well as the opportunity for public comment. For 
example, at the selection phase, in addition to asking the public for 
nominations of chemicals, the EPA was required to consult with 
OMB after receiving nominations to determine which of the 
substances nominated it would evaluate. Before creating its 
toxological review, the EPA would prepare a qualitative 
assessment of the chemical, including potential health risk, 
susceptible populations, and potential uncertainties. This 
assessment would then be open to comments from the public and 
OMB (which would provide the assessment to other agencies). In 
addition, if another agency demonstrated the chemical to be critical 
to its mission, that agency could require further study of the 
substance.209 In other words, the process, while adding to the delay 
criticized by the GAO, allowed for increased accountability of the 
process towards the OMB and other agencies as well as increased 
opportunities for public input. 
In May 2009, the EPA’s administrator revised the process once 
again, announcing the change in a memo to top EPA officials that 
was also published on the agency’s website.210 The goal of the new 
process was to streamline and simplify the review process. OMB 
                                                          
208 Id. at 3–5. 
209 White House Gains Influence in Toxic Chemical Assessments, supra 
note 206.  
210 Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, supra note 6.  
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would now review only at two stages, before and after the input of 
the expert peer review. The agency announced that it would lead 
the new process (previously, the process was coordinated and 
managed by OMB)—the EPA would give the other agencies 
opportunity to comment and will meet with them, but it intends to 
have the final say.211 Other agencies will no longer be able to delay 
the process to conduct research on “mission critical” chemicals.212 
In addition, all written comments from other agencies and the 
White House were to be made public.213 
On the one hand, the agency made substantial efforts to reduce 
delays, but on the other hand it increased accountability to the 
public by providing more information on its decision-making 
process. Generally speaking, throughout all the reforms, the EPA 
struggled to balance thorough review of the assessment process 
with efficiency, sometimes leaning more one way, sometimes more 
the other; but in all cases, it worked hard to increase 
accountability, primarily by increasing the input of external actors 
and thus giving them more opportunities to impact the final 
decision.  
3. The Online Dialogue 
In 2001, the EPA engaged in an online dialogue to supplement 
traditional hearings for comment on its “Draft Public Involvement 
Policy” (PIP) and on ways that it could be implemented.214 The 
fact that the EPA conducted such a dialogue at all evidences their 
search for ways to become more accountable; the content of the 
dialogue provides additional evidence that the agency was actively 
                                                          
211 Id. at 4. 
212 EPA Announces New IRIS Assessment Development Process, ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, (May 21, 2009), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/ 
48f0fa7dd51f9e9885257359003f5342/065e2c61afea0917852575bd0064c9db!O
penDocument. 
213 Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, supra note 6. 
214 Thomas C. Beierle, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DEMOCRACY ON-
LINE: AN EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
IN EPA DECISIONS 15 (Jan. 2002), http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-RPT-
demonline.pdf. 
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trying to improve its accountability.  
The 2001 dialogue involved 1,166 members of the public and 
substantial numbers of the EPA staff. 215 The process started with 
the circulation of a draft of the PIP for comments in December 
2000.216 The process was open to anyone, and the EPA engaged in 
substantial efforts to advertise it. Quoting from Beirle, the author 
of a report on the dialogue: 
EPA staff sent announcements via EPA mailing lists and 
listservs and spread the word through personal contacts and 
mailings to a wide variety of institutions involved in 
environmental policy, including environmental 
organizations, state and local governments, small 
businesses, and tribal groups.  Internally, they distributed 
information to 1,500 EPA staff—including all coordinators 
of environmental justice, tribal, communications, and 
community-based environmental protection programs—
with a request to pass on information about the Dialogue to 
their regular contacts. Information Renaissance publicized 
the Dialogue through information channels it had 
developed through previous on-line dialogues. Some 
people who received announcements about the Dialogue 
forwarded them through their own networks.217 
About a month before the dialogue, people could register, 
either as active or passive participants.  (“Active” meant one was 
allowed to both read and post messages, “passive” meant reading 
privileges only.)218 There was a dialogue website where the EPA 
and Information Renaissance posted an electronic briefing book 
with substantial amounts of materials.219  
Ten of the EPA’s offices held a day of discussion each. 
Participants could post messages or answer previous messages in a 
                                                          
215 Id. at 8; Patricia A. Bonner et al., Bringing the Public and the 
Government Together Through On-Line Dialogues, in THE DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 102, at 146–47. 
216 BEIERLE, supra note 214, at 15.    
217 Id. at 16.  
218 Id. at 17.  
219 Id. at 18. 
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thread.220 Officials responded to “something [sic] that was relevant 
to their programs.”221 The material collected was included in the 
EPA brochures222 and in a Public Involvement Policy issued in 
June 2003.223 A report was prepared after the fact describing the 
process in detail.224 
In these three very different examples, the EPA constantly 
strove to increase input from stakeholders into the process and to 
increase the transparency of the process. In the IRIS case, at least, 
the costs of accountability may have outweighed the benefits; but 
all cases demonstrate the agency’s strong commitment to 
accountability.  
C. The IRS Seeks Accountability 
In 1998 Congress passed the Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, substantially changing the 
regulatory environment of the IRS.225 One of the goals of the act 
was to increase the agency’s accountability.226 The reform was 
passed amid substantial accusations of lack of accountability. In a 
typical example, Senator Grassley said the IRS: 
“[S]eems to be squeezing the little guy to get the money while 
this set of four witnesses are telling us that the big tax liability is 
often forgiven. And the cause of this, of course, I think, and it is 
the basic unfairness is the lack of accountability.”227 
                                                          
220 Id. at 17.  
221 Bonner, supra note 215, at 147.  
222 Id. at n.21; Online Publication Title List, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://nepis.epa.gov/EPA/html/Pubs/pubtitleOther.htm (last updated Sept. 14, 
2010) (providing brochures on public involvement, numbered 233F03005-12, 
233F03014). 
223 Public Involvement Policy of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, (May 2003), http://www.epa.gov/public 
involvement/policy2003/finalpolicy.pdf.  
224 BEIERLE, supra note 214, at 8.  
225 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. 
L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, available at http://www.gpo.gov:80/fdsys/pkg/ 
PLAW-105publ206/pdf/PLAW-105publ206.pdf.  
226 E.g., Henning, supra note 135. 
227 IRS Oversight, supra note 38 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley, 
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Similarly, Senator Frank Murkowski from Alaska said: “[W]e 
agreed that there was no accountability in the IRS. We agreed that 
the system was designed to avoid accountability.”228 To correct 
that, among other things, the Act made customer service one of the 
main goals the IRS should aspire to, and added a variety of 
accountability mechanisms.229  
It is of course true that this reform was imposed from the 
outside by Congress, and had input from some members who were 
actively hostile to the IRS.230 However, the IRS Commissioner, 
Charles O. Rossotti strongly supported reforming the agency and 
had substantial input into some of the provisions of the Act.231 
Rossotti continued to express commitment to the reform, and under 
his direction the IRS engaged in substantial efforts to increase its 
accountability, efforts that continued under Commissioner 
Shulman.232 These reforms paralleled and reinforced ongoing 
efforts of officials inside the IRS, which had begun before the 
reform, to increase its transparency and responsiveness.233 
This section will mention two examples: the Taxpayer 
Advocacy Panel, which allowed a panel of citizens substantial 
input into the IRS’s operations, and the efforts to increase the 
accuracy and transparency of the IRS policies. This is a shortened 
description; both efforts deserve a much more detailed treatment, 
but that is a matter for another article.  
                                                          
Iowa). 
228 Id. at 9 (statement of Sen. Frank S. Murkowski, Alaska).  
229 See Thorndike, supra note 135, at 768. Some of these were quite 
draconian; for example, the “ten deadly sins” provision decreed that IRS 
employees will be fired if they violated one of its ten vague provisions (e.g. 
violating any of the internal Revenue Manual provisions). See Rainey & 
Thompson, supra note 9, at 599. 
230 See Thorndike, supra note 135. 
231 Id. at 775–77; Rainey & Thompson, supra note 9, at 597. 
232 Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality) 
(June 24, 2009). 
233 Id.; Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of 
confidentiality) (July 1, 2009); Telephone Interview with Deborah Gascard 
Wolf, Director of the Office of Privacy, Information Protection and Data 
Security, IRS (July 14, 2009). 
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1. Taxpayer Advocacy Panel 
In 2002 the Department of the Treasury, together with high 
IRS officials and the Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson, created the 
Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.234 The panel is a collection of one 
hundred volunteer citizens, organized into a number of issue 
committees, who contribute three hundred hours each to reviewing 
the IRS activity and offer recommendations for improvements. The 
reports that come out of this activity include very detailed 
recommendations by the panel and a response—often detailed—
from the relevant IRS official. The response can be adoption of the 
panel’s recommendations,235 a promise to consider them,236 or 
                                                          
234 See What We Do, TAXPAYER ADVOCACY PANEL, http://www.im 
proveirs.org/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2011) (describing the panel).  
According to the TAP’s first annual report from 2003, it was created when  
[t]he Department of the Treasury, in response to a review of Federal 
Advisory Committee Act Boards, recommended nation-wide expansion 
of the Citizen Advocacy Panel established in June 1998, to be renamed 
the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (TAP). The Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) established a Design Steering Committee comprised of the 
National Taxpayer Advocate, Executives from Wage & Investment 
(W&I), Small Business/Self Employed (SB/SE), the Communications 
and Liaison Office, and National Treasury Employees Union 
Representatives to design the new Panel.  
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAXPAYER ADVOCACY PANEL ANNUAL REPORT ii 
(Dec. 31, 2003), http://www.improveirs.org/Content/documents/annual%20 
reports/2003AnnualReport.pdf.  
235 See, e.g., Taxpayer Advocacy Panel Recommendations, http://www.im 
proveirs.org/Content/documents/recommendations/2007-Recommendations_ 
10_29_2009.pdf: 
The Committee recommended and the OTBR [Office of Taxpayer 
Burden Reduction. D.R.] accepted the recommendations of removing, 
modifying and/or consolidating lines on the Form 2678 and on the 
Schedule R (Form 941). The OTBR also accepted the recommendation 
to make some minor changes to the verbiage on both forms. A major 
change to the Form 2678 was to have both employer and agent’s 
signature on the Form as opposed to only having the employer’s 
signature as in the past. 
236 See, e.g., id. at 7: 
Form 12153 is a critical part of Collection Due Process that begins the 
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rejection with an explanation.237 
To give one example, as part of the effort to protect citizens’ 
privacy by reducing the availability of social security numbers, the 
IRS is working on regulations that will allow issuers of form 
1099238 to only provide some digits of the social security number 
rather than the entire number. That decision, explained Deborah 
Wolf, Director of Privacy, Information Protection and Data 
Security in the IRS, was the result of a recommendation by the 
Information Reporting Advisory Committee, a committee of the 
Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.239 The committee recommended 
treating the W2 forms provided by employers in a similar fashion, 
but that requires a change in legislation, which will take longer.240  
The creation and continuing existence of the Taxpayer 
Advocacy Panel shows in two ways how the two agencies (the IRS 
and the Treasury) are actively working to increase their 
accountability. First, the Treasury Department acted voluntarily to 
create the panel (with collaboration by the IRS).  Second, the IRS 
regularly engages in dialogue with the panel, with top officials 
responding to panel recommendations in ways that can include 
changes in policies in accordance with what the panel has 
recommended—again, opening themselves to criticisms of their 
response and to input from stakeholders.  
                                                          
hearing process when the form is received by Collection. With that in 
mind, it is important that taxpayers understand the intent of the form, 
how to complete the form, and when and where to return the form. 
Your comments and suggestions will help us improve the form to meet 
these goals. 
237 As was done for one of the recommendations in TAP A07-4066. See id. 
at 8–9. 
238 Form 1099 is used to report withholding of a variety of incomes, 
including, commonly, interest. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
FORM 1099-MISC (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099 
msc.pdf.  
239 Telephone Interview with Deborah Gascard Wolf, supra note 233. 
240 Id.  
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2. Increasing Transparency and Accuracy of the Internal Revenue 
Manual 
The core of this discussion is the IRS’s effort to increase its 
transparency through making its policies more easily accessible.  
One of the criticisms raised against the agency in the discussions 
leading to the 1998 reform was the lack of transparency of its 
policies, which sometimes had the effect of making life very 
difficult for citizens who had been accused of non-compliance due 
to errors.241 Even before that, the IRS had been working on 
improving the transparency in its policies and procedures.  
However, it seems—though the causality is hard to trace—that the 
criticisms raised during the reform gave the project of increasing 
transparency an extra push. The IRS expressed a commitment to 
making the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) reflect current 
policies (not easy for an extremely large agency with an annual 
deadline) and has taken a series of steps in that direction.242 The 
Office of Servicewide Policy, Directives and Electronic Research 
(“SPDER”), created in 1999, engaged in a series of initiatives to 
oversee and coordinate transparency, including sending out 
memoranda reminding staff of the need to make interim guidance 
available to the public and to train staff accordingly. Guided by 
SPDER, the IRS units created and implemented internal 
procedures to post interim guidance memoranda electronically, a 
process monitored by SPDER.  
As a first step, SPDER worked to change the format of the 
IRM from paper to electronic and to restructure it so that it was 
organized by processes rather than by the IRS organizational units. 
The change to an electronic format was crucial to achieve accuracy 
and accessibility. An electronic format was easier to distribute and 
review. It was also easier to search, and thus made it easier to find 
                                                          
241 See generally Henning, supra note 135. 
242 The description is taken from the comments of IRS officials to the 
Taxpayer Advocate’s criticisms of their lack of transparency. 1 NAT’L 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 24–26 
(2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2006_arc_vol_1_cover__section_1.pdf. 
The substance of the descriptions has been acknowledged by the National 
Taxpayer Advocate. Id. at 27. 
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inconsistencies when searches came up with a variety of results.243   
Prior to the changes, the IRM was organized by unit, by the 
title of the office, not by the process in question—which made it 
easy for office members to update, but hard for people outside the 
IRS to know their way around. It also made it very easy for 
inconsistencies to be generated in relation to specific processes and 
for inconsistencies to persist. This first step presented both an 
administrative challenge—it was a large reorganization—and an 
educational challenge: members of the staff had to be convinced 
that the change was necessary, or at least inevitable. Some 
resistance was encountered because many employees strongly 
identified with their particular units.244  
SPDER also invests substantially in training IRM authors in 
how to write the manual in a transparent and easy to use way, 
offering aggressive (though voluntary) training programs.245 The 
goal is to write the IRM following information mapping principles, 
active voice, and plain language. 
Another change was a revision of the policy governing 
disclosure of materials which are intended only for internal use.246 
Prior to the mid 2000s, the agency’s policy was not to publish 
documents if any part of that document was for official use only. 
SPDER initiated a redaction process whereby paragraphs that are 
for internal use only are removed from documents, and what 
remains is published, substantially increasing the amount of 
publicly available material.247  
As can be seen from this very short description, substantial 
efforts were made by the IRS to increase the transparency and 
accessibility of its policy.  
                                                          
243 Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality) 
(July 1, 2009); Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of 
confidentiality) (June 24, 2009). 
244 Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality) 
(July 1, 2009). 
245 Id. 
246 Which may fall under any of a number of exemptions to FOIA. See 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(b)(2), (5), (7) (West 2010). 
247 Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality) 
(July 1, 2009). A more detailed description of the IRS reforms is in preparation. 
REISS - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:02 PM 
670 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
A. What is NOT Implied? 
Let’s start with what this Article is not intended to imply. I am 
not saying that the need for external accountability mechanisms is 
obviated by the discovery that agencies often will be accountable 
on their own. Most of the efforts to increase accountability 
described in this Article were undertaken by agencies facing the 
vast array of accountability mechanisms described in Part I, and 
their actions were taken in the context of those mechanisms. 
Further, as the case studies demonstrate, the agencies making these 
efforts were agencies “under fire”—they were already being 
subjected to substantial criticism for, among other things, lack of 
accountability. The IRS already faced the experience of 
accountability mechanisms added, and massive reorganization 
imposed, because of accusations of lack of accountability that 
stuck.248 It is unclear whether the agencies would have made the 
same kinds of efforts to be accountable without external 
accountability pressures, but a strong argument can be made that at 
least in part their efforts to increase accountability were motivated 
by the desire to head off more external attempts to do it for them. It 
does not require evil intent for agencies not to undertake such 
efforts: agencies have many other tasks besides being accountable, 
and without strong motivators to invest in accountability, these can 
easily (and possibly with good reason) take precedence.  
Beyond that, even an agency that is strongly committed to 
accountability because of its sense of mission may not construct 
accountability mechanisms in ways that are valued by either its 
political masters or the public in general. Those outside the agency 
may have different preferences than the agency as to what form the 
accountability should take, and how it should be structured, and 
without external mechanisms they may not be able to influence an 
agency’s choice. For example, the EPA’s design of the 
accountability framework surrounding IRIS was strongly criticized 
by the GAO as damaging to its efficiency, and by OMB Watch as 
                                                          
248 See supra Part III.C. 
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inserting a political component into a professional decision.249 The 
FDA’s decision to summarize and publish information about its 
decisions on new drug applications was criticized by industry 
members for providing too much information and harming the 
industry, and by consumer protection organizations for not 
providing enough data.250 
Even if the motivations of the agency are accepted as valid, and 
an agency strongly buys into the accountability language, it may 
not be especially well versed in the tools and mechanisms 
available. An agency may lack expertise and not do a particularly 
good job of increasing its accountability even if it is extremely 
professional in other areas. For example, while the IRS has been 
making efforts to increase the transparency of its policies for 
several years, the 2006 Taxpayer Advocate Service Annual Report 
highlighted certain problems, such as internal memos not 
published.251 Hutt sees the FDA as working to increase its 
transparency, but as demonstrated in Part II.A, external observers 
criticize it for lack of transparency. External direction may be 
required to help agencies steer their accountability choices.  
Finally, as demonstrated by the example of the Minerals 
Management Service,252 not all agencies seek accountability—or 
are accountable—all the time, and to prevent extreme cases of 
abuses, external mechanisms are crucial. 
The other thing I am not asserting in this Article is that efforts 
by agencies to increase accountability are generally successful. 
Assessing success of accountability mechanisms requires two 
complex, challenging inquiries, neither of which I undertake here. 
The first is a value judgment as to just what a successful 
accountability mechanism would look like. For example, suppose 
it is a mechanism that increases input from outside parties; if that 
proves so effective that it gives stakeholders or citizens full 
control, is that outcome desirable, or not? Substantial input from 
                                                          
249 See supra Part III.B. 
250 See supra Part III.A. 
251 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 21 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2006_arc_vol_ 
1_cover__section_1.pdf. 
252 See supra Part I.A.  
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stakeholders can be seen as an agency being responsive or as an 
agency captured; in the matter of public participation, some 
scholars strongly support extensive participation,253 others are 
concerned that it may harm expertise and decision making.254 As 
for publication, the benefits and costs of transparency are also 
debated.255 If increasing transparency is a good, should agencies 
provide more information or provide information in a more 
simplified, easy to access way?  
Agreeing on some standardized benchmarks is one challenge to 
making a scholarly assessment of success at improving 
accountability; another challenge is presented by the wide range of 
empirical measurement problems that exist—experimental design 
and data collection present serious difficulties in real-world 
situations. For instance, if we agree that public participation and 
input of citizens into the process is a good, how do we measure 
whether there actually was input? Do we look at the number of 
participants and the number of comments they made, as was done 
in studies evaluating participation in rulemaking?256 This approach 
can be challenged on the grounds that “comments” can be nothing 
but answers checked off on standardized forms, or that merely 
submitting comments does not mean that any effective input to the 
process occurred.257 Or, alternatively, do we look at ways the 
agency may have changed its views after receipt of the comments? 
This is another measure some of the same scholars used.  Here, we 
can ask whether “change” is for the better or not—change is not 
                                                          
253 See generally James S. Fishkin, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW 
DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991); LEIB, supra note 101; Arnstein, 
supra note 101; Innes & Booher, supra note 101. 
254 Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy?, 
supra note 105, at 93–113. 
255 See generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS 
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of 
Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006); Hood, supra note 69. 
256 Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 414–15; Golden, supra note 104, at 245–47; West, supra 
note 14, at 66–70. 
257 See Reiss, Tailored Participation, supra note 20, at 331–35; Schlosberg,  
supra note 103. 
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always justified.258 A more general reason this Article does not 
address the question of assessment is that while there is room and 
need for articles examining the success of efforts at increasing 
accountability, this article has a different focus.259 Accordingly, 
this Article is not being presented as evidence that agencies do a 
good job at being accountable—just that they try.  
B. What is Implied?  
In this Article I intend to show that agencies are not always the 
enemy in the “accountability game” and are never just a pawn 
either. First, as to agencies not being the enemy—as this Article 
demonstrates, important agencies make substantial efforts to 
increase their accountability and agency officials often buy into 
reforms aimed at increasing accountability. Several of the 
mechanisms later adopted by Congress or the courts were initially 
tested or adopted by agencies. For example, the FDA adopted a 
preamble requirement and a requirement of answering comments 
independent from judicial review; in addition, various agencies 
experimented with negotiated rulemaking before Congress passed 
an act that mandated it.  
The case studies suggest that a variety of motivations influence 
agencies to make these efforts. For example, a typical case is that 
of an agency under attack trying to improve its accountability so as 
to reduce the severity of the attacks and simultaneously make real 
improvements in performance. All three agencies that I report on 
in this Article acted to increase their accountability after being 
strongly attacked. This would support the view that agencies are 
                                                          
258  Several studies have already attempted to analyze the actual impact of 
comments. See, e.g., Cuéllar, supra note 256, at 433–34; Golden, supra note 
104, at 261; West, supra note 14, at 68; Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb 
Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the 
U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006).  
259 See, e.g., Martina Vidovic & Neha Khanna, Can Voluntary Pollution 
Prevention Programs Fulfill Their Promises? Further Evidence from the EPA’s 
33/50 Program, 53 ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 180, 180–83 (2007); Michael R. 
Greenberg & Justin Hollander, The Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Brownfields Pilot Program, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 277, 277–79 (2006) 
(indicating how complicated the methodology of evaluating a program is). 
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unwilling participants in the accountability game. However, the 
extent of agencies’ efforts and their level of innovation suggest that 
a desire to avoid punishment was not the only thing driving the 
agencies—a level of commitment to the idea of accountability, and 
some effect of the ideas of participation and transparency, also 
exists.  
My second major point is that viewing agencies as the 
“subject” is a mistake. Much of the accountability literature sees 
agencies as being “acted upon,” as primarily responding to 
accountability mechanisms put in place by others. The famous 
McNollgast studies address how Congress can shape agencies’ 
environment to assure compliance with Congressional 
preferences.260 Studies of judicial review focus on behavior and 
how courts evaluate agencies,261 rather than seeing the agency and 
courts as co-participants in the game, with the agency having 
substantial power to affect how a court will review it.262 Agencies 
are typically sophisticated political actors.263 They can and do 
                                                          
260 McCubbins, Administrative Procedures, supra note 16, at 243–45; 
McCubbins, Structure and Process, supra note 16. 
261 See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Bringing Deference Back (But For How 
Long?): Justice Alito, Chevron, Auer, and Chenery in the Supreme Court’s 2006 
Term, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: 
An Empricial Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 
YALE  J. ON REG. 1 (1998); Nicholas J. Leddy, Determining Due Deference: 
Examining When Courts Should Defer to Agency Use of Presidential Signing 
Statements, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 869 (2007); Pierce, Judicial Review, supra note 
92; Thomas O. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of 
Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 599 (1997). 
262 With some exceptions—one possible exception is O’Reilly, Losing 
Deference, supra note 17, at 949–50, 977–78 (loss of deference to FDA is 
largely because it became captured by political actors). But see David C. 
Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-inflicted Wound or the Product of 
a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor O’Reilly, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
981, 983–85 (2008) (offering an opposing view). 
263 See, e.g., CARPENTER, supra note 57, at 19–25; Reiss, Agency 
Accountability, supra note 46, at 114–15; Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Administrative 
Agencies as Creators of Administrative Law Norms: Evidence from the UK, 
France and Sweden, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 373–74 (Susan 
Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds. 2010)  (unpublished copy on file with 
author); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY— WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
REISS - FINAL.DOC 5/9/2011  4:02 PM 
 Account Me In 675 
influence their accountability environment. Agencies do respond to 
other actors, but they also tailor their behaviors in ways that will 
help achieve the best accountability environment they can, given 
the political and institutional constraints they face.264 One way 
agencies can influence their environment is by making efforts of 
their own to increase their accountability, thus preempting external 
efforts. This suggests a number of important policy implications 
for current administrative law and practice.  
An important question is how to incentivize agencies to 
undertake more efforts to increase their accountability—assuming 
that increased accountability is considered necessary.265 If 
accountability is a positive, more accountability is better than less, 
and we want agencies to be more accountable. But if that is the 
case, maybe agencies should be rewarded for their efforts at 
increasing accountability. Lack of incentives may lead agencies to 
work to improve accountability less often than is desirable. For 
example, a plausible argument is that the relative rarity of 
negotiated rulemaking undertaken by agencies can be explained by 
a lack of incentives. Several studies suggest that even if the 
participants are satisfied with the process,266 from the agency’s 
point of view there may not be sufficient incentive, since it still has 
to go through the regular notice and comment procedures anyway. 
At any rate, in spite of efforts by the Clinton administration to 
increase the use of negotiated rulemaking,267 the number of such 
                                                          
DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 27–28, 88–89 (1989). 
264 See Reiss, Agency Accountability, supra note 46, at 114–15. 
265 Not at all obvious—as the “Agencies as Victims” literature described in 
Part I.B demonstrates, a strong claim may be made that there is enough, if not 
too much, accountability already in the administrative state. However, the claim 
for more accountability seems to be stronger—and even if we do not think 
MORE accountability is a positive, better accountability may be—more 
streamlined and efficient tools that achieve the same effects.  
266 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 201, at 55–56; Laura I. 
Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation v. Conventional 
Rulemaking: Claims, Counterclaims and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. 
RES. & THEORY 599, 625–26 (2000). But see Cary Coglianese, Assessing the 
Advocacy, supra note 201, at 404–06 (challenging the methodological tools and 
conclusions of these studies).  
267 Harter, Assessing the Assessors, supra note 201, at 36–37. 
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rulemakings remains very small.268 One incentive may be reducing 
some of the external controls for agencies which engage in their 
own processes—following the same logic as the EPA’s voluntary 
compliance plans that carry with them the suggestion of reduced 
enforcement against participants.269 This will probably require 
legislation. Another incentive would be to allow agencies brought 
to court with claims of lack of participation or transparency to 
present evidence of efforts to increase their accountability and 
provide a holistic picture of accountability.  
One way for a court to deal with a claim of insufficient 
participation or transparency is to charge the agency with 
producing a plan for increasing accountability, thus taking 
advantage of the ability of agencies to create their own 
accountability mechanisms. That way, the court does not directly 
dictate new procedures—forbidden under Vermont Yankee270—but 
can still address a lack of sufficient procedures. Courts may be less 
reluctant to allow agencies to use guidelines271 if the agencies 
                                                          
268 Coglianese, Assessing Consensus, supra note 191, at 1276–77. 
269 See Richard N.L. Andrews et al., Environmental Management Systems: 
History, Theory, and Implementation Research, in REGULATING FROM THE 
INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY 
GOALS? 32–33, 42–43 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001). 
270 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 
519, 523–25 (1978).  
271 For example, the D.C. Circuit criticized agencies for using guidance 
documents instead of rulemaking and avoiding rulemaking in two cases. See 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 290 F.3d 377, 384–85 (2002) (not addressing what 
procedures were used in the issuance of the guidance document); Appalachian 
Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (2000): 
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a 
broadly worded statute. The agency follows with regulations containing 
broad language, open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the like. 
Then as years pass, the agency issues circulars or guidance or 
memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often expanding the 
commands in the regulations. One guidance document may yield 
another and then another and so on. Several words in a regulation may 
spawn hundreds of pages of text as the agency offers more and more 
detail regarding what its regulations demand of regulated entities. Law 
is made, without notice and comment, without public participation, and 
without publication in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal 
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present a scheme for making sure those guidelines are transparent 
and allow for stakeholder input into their making. Guidelines have 
a number of advantages over rules: they are more flexible, and 
therefore may be more suitable to fast-changing environments, 
they do not suffer from the same degree of ossification,272 and they 
allow—in fact, mandate—agency deviation in appropriate specific 
cases. Allowing guidelines an official place under these narrow 
circumstances is especially useful since the jurisprudence about 
policy documents versus rules is vague and the criteria to 
distinguish them are unclear.273 If an agency created a document 
that could fall under either category through a process that either 
closely follows informal rulemaking procedures or goes beyond 
them and adds substantial accountability guarantees, why 
invalidate it?  
This need for incentives is especially true since one of the 
challenges any agency head will face is that of competing demands 
on time; achieving accountability requires time and effort. For 
example, in the case of the FDA, when confronted with changes in 
the agency’s enabling act along with demands for investigation of 
alleged misrepresentations of the results of clinical trials, drafting 
the Medical Device Act of 1976, and a large range of other 
missions, promoting accountability was not always the first 
priority.274 Similarly, updating the Internal Revenue Manual to 
keep IRS policies transparent may not be the first priority for an 
official burdened with many other chores. One IRS official 
explained that it is seen as “record keeping,” and often with “so 
                                                          
Regulations. With the advent of the Internet, the agency does not need 
these official publications to ensure widespread circulation; it can 
inform those affected simply by posting its new guidance or 
memoranda or policy statement on its web site. 
272 Lubbers, The Transformation, supra note 18, at 471–72. See also Peter 
L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1480–82 (1992) 
[hereinafter Strauus, The Rulemaking Continuum]. 
273 On this difficulty, see Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, supra note 272, at 1476–
79. For the negative effects of the difficulty see Richard M. Thomas, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v. Young and the 
Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 155 (1992).  
274 Telephone Interview with Richard A. Merrill, supra note 145. 
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many other things to do, if they look at a list of priorities, IRM and 
updating it falls to the bottom of the list.”275 According some 
deference to an agency engaged in accountability seeking can help 
balance those costs and provide an incentive for such behavior.  
In addition to creating incentives, acknowledging that agencies 
engage in increasing accountability can open the door to more 
systematic study of such activity, as suggested by Magill in the 
context of self-regulation.276 Besides providing a promising source 
of information and thought for researchers trying to understand 
agency action, it can make a wealth of information more 
systematically available that will be useful for policy makers in all 
three branches. If one of the justifications for federalism is 
experimentation in different forms of democracy to allow 
innovation and the testing of ideas,277 the same can be said for 
experimentation with accountability mechanisms among agencies: 
a type of “administrative federalism.” If agencies are allowed, even 
encouraged, to experiment, all three branches can benefit. 
The branch with the most natural access, and the one already 
benefitting from such experimentation, is the executive branch. 
Agencies learn from each other—for example, other agencies 
emulated the experience of the first agencies with negotiated 
rulemaking, and OMB incorporated it into an executive order, 
recommending it to all agencies.278  
This learning can be made even more systematic if we learn 
from other countries’ experience. For example, in Australia, there 
is an “Office of Best Practice Regulation” to study how to make 
regulation better, including increasing its transparency.279 Another 
potential international source of inspiration is the Organisation for 
                                                          
275 Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality) 
(July 1, 2009). 
276 See Magill, supra note 59, at 860–61. 
277 See Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in 
Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1233–36 (1994). 
278 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557–61 (1994).  
279 See Office of Best Practice Regulation, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, DEP’T FIN. 
& DEREGULATION, http://www.finance.gov.au/obpr/about/ (last updated July 5, 
2010). 
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Economic Co-operation & Development’s (OECD) report 
comparing best practices across countries.280 
Similarly, examining accountability mechanisms created by 
agencies could provide Congress with ideas for new accountability 
mechanisms and with real-world data as to what worked and what 
did not, thus facilitating the making of informed decisions when 
drafting legislation.  
Finally, knowledge of agency practices could guide courts as to 
where to put—and where to avoid—emphasis. If a mechanism 
were found to have been widely adopted by agencies and seemed 
to be working, that could justify increased deference.281 
Just as important, agencies engaging in increasing 
accountability require training and resources to do so. For 
example, in an age where transparency is increasing through use of 
online mechanisms, agencies need training in the use of 
information technology, and in many cases personnel with new 
kinds of abilities. Some agencies have already started hiring people 
with new skills:  
[SPDER] hired a college professor to help with curriculum 
and the tax forms[,] . . . someone with background in 
lobbying . . . [, and] an IT person, working on the move to 
an electronic environment. . . . I would not have thought I 
would hire them, but as times change we need people with 
different skills.282  
But for a variety of reasons, including budgetary constraints, 
this may not have been enough. These needs must be taken into 
consideration.  
                                                          
280 Cesar Cordova-Novion, Simple, Effective, Transparent Regulation: Best 
Practices in OECD Countries, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & 
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/26/1897852.ppt (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2011).  
281 I suspect some of the requirements placed on agencies by courts over 
the years were actually ideas borrowed from existing agency practices, either in 
or across agencies. But that is a topic for another project and requires further 
research.  
282 Telephone Interview with IRS official (under promise of confidentiality) 
(Aug. 3, 2009). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article suggests that agencies are accountable, and 
furthermore, that many agencies want to be accountable and make 
efforts in that direction. It suggests that agencies’ efforts to 
increase their accountability are not sufficiently noticed or  
acknowledged. In relation to their accountability behavior, 
agencies are either criticized or pitied in most of the current 
literature. Both approaches are too simplistic. In terms of criticism, 
being an administrator in the United States is an exceedingly 
difficult job. The United States is large and complex, which makes 
managing any problem difficult. Its political system is 
decentralized, which adds another layer of complexity—as if 
managing services or regulation for three hundred million people 
would not be enough, it needs to be done in a fragmented system 
with many veto points.283 And like most modern states, it engages 
in many different spheres of activities.284 This already makes an 
administrator’s job hard. In addition, administrators in the United 
States are everyone’s favorite whipping boy and routinely 
criticized, among other things for their lack of accountability. 285 
This Article suggests that these claims are at least one-sided 
and ignore an important part of the picture. The accusation that 
bureaucrats are unaccountable and seek to avoid the public eye is, 
at best, of limited validity, and at any rate, requires proof before it 
can be made. In many situations, it is just not true. 
The concern about agency victimization and too much 
accountability also focuses only on part of the picture, treating 
agencies as lacking control of their environment and ignoring their 
contribution to the accountability reality.  
This Article is an attempt to give a fuller picture. Agencies also 
contribute to their accountability environment, by acting, at times, 
as “accountability entrepreneurs” and at other times as 
accountability brokers.  
Does that mean we do not need to worry about agency 
                                                          
283  KAGAN, supra note 48 at 42. 
284 See MEIER, supra note 13, at 2–5.   
285 See examples supra Part I.A.  
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accountability? Unfortunately no. First, efforts by agencies to be 
accountable may not be effective, or may aim at the wrong 
problems. So, even when we do not need to worry about the 
motives of agencies in relation to accountability, we still need to 
worry about the design of accountability. Second, agencies still 
face the problem of multiple principals, and their priorities may 
differ from those of the Congress or the public.286 Assuming that 
legislative supremacy is ingrained and required under the 
American constitutional scheme, efforts may be necessary to align 
agency accountability behavior with congressional preferences. 
Finally, not all agencies will make these efforts, and those that do 
may not make them all the time.  
Even so, taking all of the foregoing caveats into account and 
giving each its full weight, it still seems clear that we cannot 
ignore agencies’ efforts to increase their own accountability.  
 
                                                          
286  See Furlong, supra note 97, at 61. 
